[EM] James: MMPO & criteria

Wed Jun 8 22:57:25 PDT 2005

James replying to Mike.

    MMPO meets FBC, WDSC, and SFC.

(All criteria that Mike made up, I think.)

I comment:

I wrote those criteria. "Made up" implies some sort of falsification of 
fact. James, the criteria that I "made up" are more relevant than the 
criteria that you copy.

James says:

If we're comparing MMPO to
beatpath(wv), then the only new compliance listed above is FBC.

I comment:

With AERLO, MMPO meets Strong FBC, another criterion that BeatpathWinner 
doesn't meet.

Also LNH, though that isn't important to me.

James says:

I wasn't really focusing on the cardinal pairwise-MMPO comparison.
Instead, I was primarily comparing MMPO to things like ER-IRV, SD(wv), and
beatpath(wv). However, since he brings it up, here's a quick summary:
* pro MMPO: 1. LNHarm, 2. zero compromising-reversal incentive

I comment:

James, true to his arrogant nature, is again re-naming my criteria. And, as 
usual, again his renaming is incorrect. What could be called "compromising 
reversal" can profit you in MMPO, if the candidate ovewr whom you raise your 
compromise isn't your favorite. That's why I call it _Favorite_ Betrayal.

But if you want someone more explicit than "Favorite-Betrayal", we could 
change it to "Favorite Burial Criterion". That has a more explicit meaning.

James continues:

(as opposed
to an extremely small compromising-reversal incentive)

I comment:

A small probability that a favorite-burial will profit the voter does not 
translate to a small incentive to favorite-bury. Depending on that voter's 
valuation of the candidates, even a small probability that the 
favorite-burial will bring gain could result in a stong incentive, an 
irresistable incentive, to favorite-bury.

, 3. maybe very
slightly less vulnerable to burying-compression strategies (?)

I comment:

Translation: Truncation (?)

Every method other than Plurality can penalize truncation. No method can 
help someone who fails to help a needed compromise. MMPO penalizes 
truncation slightly more than wv does, because it does so for a set of 
voters, and under circumstances, that wv wouldn't. But it isn't an important 
difference.

James continues:

* pro CWP: 1. Smith, 2. Condorcet, 3. MMC

I comment:

These are criteria that apply when everyone votes sincerely. What James 
seems to miss is the fact that, with a method for which an absolutely firm 
FBC guarantee can't be made, he won't need to worry about everyone voting 
sincerely.

James continues:

, 4. CL, 5. less
compromising-compression incentive,

I comment:

Equal 1st ranking? James is assuming that MMPO doesn't have AERLO.  The fact 
that MMPO and AERLO are separate proposals is not a disadvantage for MMPO. 
It's an advantage, because the added complexity of an enhancement can be 
added after the basic method is enacted. MMPO is incomparably more 
proposable than CWP.

James continues:

6. much less vulnerability to
burying-reversal strategies,

I comment:

Again James is comparing CWP, a much more complicated enhancement-built-in 
method, with MMPO without AERLO or ATLO.

James continues:

7. much less incentive for deterrent
counterstrategies that distort voter rankings

I comment:

What can James be tallking about? A method that fails FBC is going to have 
much more distortion of voters' actual wishes. Voter wishes will be more 
distorted with CWP than with MMPO (with or without AERLO & ATLO).

James:
    If we're able to get beyond IRV, then why
not use SD, Smith//minmax, beatpath, ranked pairs, river, etc.?

Mike:
    1. They aren't nearly as easily and simply introduced and defined to the 
public as MMPO. They don't even come close in that regard.

James says:

I don't think that Mike has been involved enough in advocacy to make such
a firm conclusion on this point.

I comment:

What James thinks isn't always as valid as James thinks it is. I've been 
involved in enough advocacy to have experienced the fact that wv and margins 
methods need a list of preliminary definitions. MMPO needs no preliminary 
definitions. MMPO is therefore incomparably briefer and simpler than any wv 
or margins method, especially CWP, which is quite a bit more wordy than 
other wv methods.

James needs to do more listening and less asserting. But it does no good to 
tell him that. I'm wasting my time. I wasn't going to. I replied to this out 
of politeness, but it's obvious that it's a mistake. Replying to careless, 
arrogant ignorance is a waste of time.

James continues:

Few of us have, including myself of
course, but I'm not making the same kind of sweeping statements.

I comment:

As I said before, "sweeping" implies "too general to be valid". Actually 
many sweepting statements  are accurate and useful.

This isn't complicated, James: MMPO's definition is very much simpler and 
briefer than that of any wv method. CWP's definition is longer than those of 
the other wv methods. People don't like long definitions. They're much more 
likely to accept short definitions. Yes I've done enough advocacy to be in a 
position to say that with assurance.

James says:

FBC. Favorite betrayal criterion. A very dramatic name. I prefer to talk
about "compromising-reversal incentive"

I comment:

Yes, you like to rename criteria, and, because of your arrogant ignorance, 
you usually give them names that are incorrect. For instance, FBC is so 
called because it's about favorites. Your "compromising reversal" doesn't 
mention favorites. Compromising reversal can profit a voter in MMPO, when 
the candidate over whom the compromise is raised isn't one's favorite.

James continues:

, because that tells us what's
actually at issue. (The name "favorite betrayal" in itself doesn't tell us
whether ranking a less-preferred candidate equal to one's favorite
constitutes "betrayal".)

I comment:

Then change FBC to Favorite Burial Criterion. That's more explicit. If you 
don't mind, James, I'll name my criteria.

James continues:

MMPO has zero compromising-reversal incentive,
which is good. However, beatpath(wv) and SD(wv) already have a very minor
compromising-reversal incentive

I comment:

No. They have low probability of gain by favorite-burial. But that doesn't 
assure low incentive for favorite burial. Given the right 
candidate-valuations, a voter could have strong incentive to favorite-bury 
even though there's only small probability of gaining from it.

James continues:

, so this doesn't seem to be a strong
argument for MMPO over SD(wv) and beatpath(wv).
Mike's argument above is strange. He cites compromising-reversal behavior
in methods with high compromising-reversal incentive (i.e. plurality and
nER-IRV (that's IRV with no equal rankings allowed)) in an attempt to show
that compromising-reversal will continue to be a problem even in methods
with much less compromising-reversal incentive.

I comment:

I'm going to repeat it yet again for you, James, because you're too busy 
asserting to listen:

I was told by Australians that favorite-burial in IRV there isn't done 
because people know IRV's faults. It's done because they're using 
carried-over Plurality strategy. It wouldn't matter how good the method was. 
But one thing could make a difference: If someone could absolutely, 
emphatically assure them that there's no possibility of gain by 
favorite-burial. With MMPO that can be guaranteed. With CWP and wv, it can't 
be guaranteed.

James continues:

So, Mike argues that because voters frequently engage in
compromising-reversal in methods that have high compromising-reversal
incentive, we should expect voters to frequently engage in
compromising-reversal even in methods that have low compromising-reversal
incentive. This is not logical. Thus, his conclusion that FBC compliance
is a strong MMPO>beatpath(wv) argument is not well-supported.

I comment:

James, I refer you to what I said above about why Australian IRV voters 
favorite-bury. It isn't because they know the details of how bad IRV is. But 
re-read what I said above about that.

James continues:

Is one person in an internet poll a sufficient sample size to make
sweeping conclusions about voter strategy in Condorcet elections?

I comment:

As I previously explained to James, it wasn't one person in an Internet 
poll. It was one person in an Internet poll and the Australian voters.

Sweeping conclusions implies unjustifiably general conclusions. I made a 
general statement based on the available evidence, which all points the same 
way.

James, find more evidence, or shut up.

James continues:

Mike
doesn't even say what the tally method was.

I comment:

I probably said at some point that it was BeatpathWinner.

James continues:

Anyway, I wouldn't expect
voter strategy in internet polls to be a good indicator of voter strategy
in public elections, because (1) the outcome is totally unimportant, and
(2) the electorate is more technically inclined.

I coment:

Yes, less sophisticated voters in a more outcome-crucial election will 
favorite-bury more, not less.

It meets LNHarm, but it still doesn't meet LNHelp. IRV supporters won't
be impressed. LNHarm compliance by itself does little or nothing to
decrease the method's vulnerability to burying strategies.

I comment:

Who said otherwise?? LNH isn't about order-reversal.

I won't reply to another reply on this subject.

Mike Ossipoff

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