[EM] Dave on approval, ranked ballots

[Kevin Venzke]

Dave,

--- Dave Ketchum <davek at clarityconnect.com> a écrit :
> > 77 A>B>C
> > 57 B>C>A
> > 145 C>A>B
> > 143 C=B>A
> > 80 A>B>C
> > 
> > WV methods elect C. But if the 80 A>B>C voters instead lower A anywhere below
> > B, then the winner is B. So the methods ignore these voters' wish that B be elected 
> > if they can't get A.
> 
> Huh?  When they SAID they preferred B, they GOT B.

They had already said they preferred B to C.

> However, when they said they preferred A, they were a minority part of a 
> cycle in which major desire for C won.  They did not get ignored - simply 
> were too small a minority to win.

They were worse than ignored. The "A>B" part of the ballot is what causes
B to lose!

> Now try an IRV example:
> 49 Bush
> 24 Kerry>Nader
> 27 Buchanan>Nader
> 
> Now Bush wins, while liked less than Nader, for:
>       The 24 ballots get looked at and discarded.
>       Bush wins over Buchanan.
>       IRV ignores the 27 votes for Nader, without noting their existence - 
> while Condorcet would have seen that Nader earned a win.

There's a cycle here. WV would elect Nader, but Margins considers
Nader>Bush to be weak, and elects Bush.

Kevin Venzke



	

	
		
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