[EM] Another multi-seat Condorcet method (PSC-CLE)

[Dan Bishop]

Scott Ritchie wrote:

>On Mon, 2005-07-11 at 13:41 -0500, Dan Bishop wrote:
>  
>
>>* Independence of Clones: FAIL.
>>
>>Consider the example election (in which A and D won) with D replaced by 
>>D1>D2>D3:
>>
>>33 A>D1>D2>D3>B>C
>>33 B>D1>D2>D3>A>C
>>32 C>D1>D2>D3>A>B
>>  2 D1>D2>D3>A>B>C
>>
>>The elimination order is C, B, A, D3, D2, D1.  The coalition {A, D1, D2, 
>>D3} is entitled to 1 seat, and {A, B, D1, D2, D3} is entitled to 2 
>>seats.  The winners are D1 and D2, which gives the D clone set an extra 
>>seat compared to the original election.
>>    
>>
>
>D is a condorcet winner here.  D1 is a condorcet winner as well, but it
>seems very interesting to note that even if we eliminate a quota's worth
>of votes from the D supporters after declaring D1 elected, D2 would be a
>condorcet winner.  This seems meaningful, as it implies that both D1 and
>D2 have distinct quotas worth of votes rating them as top preference
>before eliminating any nonwinning candidates - that sounds like they
>should win.
>
>What if we clone someone outside of this set, ie other than D1, D2, and
>D3?  Can teaming occur then?
>
It does not.

If A is replaced by A1>A2>A3, {A1, D} wins.
If B is replaced by B1>B2>B3, {A, D} wins.
If C is replaces by C1>C2>C3, {A, D} wins.