[EM] Another multi-seat Condorcet method (PSC-CLE)

[Scott Ritchie]

On Mon, 2005-07-11 at 13:41 -0500, Dan Bishop wrote:
> * Independence of Clones: FAIL.
> 
> Consider the example election (in which A and D won) with D replaced by 
> D1>D2>D3:
> 
> 33 A>D1>D2>D3>B>C
> 33 B>D1>D2>D3>A>C
> 32 C>D1>D2>D3>A>B
>   2 D1>D2>D3>A>B>C
> 
> The elimination order is C, B, A, D3, D2, D1.  The coalition {A, D1, D2, 
> D3} is entitled to 1 seat, and {A, B, D1, D2, D3} is entitled to 2 
> seats.  The winners are D1 and D2, which gives the D clone set an extra 
> seat compared to the original election.

D is a condorcet winner here.  D1 is a condorcet winner as well, but it
seems very interesting to note that even if we eliminate a quota's worth
of votes from the D supporters after declaring D1 elected, D2 would be a
condorcet winner.  This seems meaningful, as it implies that both D1 and
D2 have distinct quotas worth of votes rating them as top preference
before eliminating any nonwinning candidates - that sounds like they
should win.

What if we clone someone outside of this set, ie other than D1, D2, and
D3?  Can teaming occur then?


Thanks,
Scott Ritchie