[EM] Condorcet failure of Approval Voting (was Re: Dave reply)

[Bart Ingles]

Daniel Bishop wrote:

> It's better than Plurality in this regard, but not perfect.
> 
> For example:
> 
> 2: Bush>Perot>Clinton  (approval vote = Bush)
> 1: Perot>Bush>Clinton  (approval vote = Bush + Perot)
> 2: Clinton>Perot>Bush  (approval vote = Clinton)
> 
> The approval vote totals are:
> 
> Bush: 3
> Clinton: 2
> Perot: 1
> 
> and so Bush wins.  But Perot is the Condorcet winner!

The result above might make sense if the above vote reflects voter 
utilities similar to:

. 100 . . voter utility or rating . . 0
----------------------------------------
2 Bush . . . . . . . . . Perot . Clinton
1 Perot . Bush . . . . . . . . . Clinton
2 Clinton . . . . . . . . . Perot . Bush

But not if:

. 100 . . voter utility or rating . . 0
----------------------------------------
2 Bush . Perot . . . . . . . . . Clinton
1 Perot . . . . . . . . . Bush . Clinton
2 Clinton . Perot . . . . . . . . . Bush

I'm aware of the problems with interpersonal comparison of utilities, 
but have a hard time viewing the two cases as equivalent.