[EM] "Approval" name out; VM17 Schulze theory fails; 80k Sincere Votes equals 80k Voters?

[Markus Schulze]

Dear Craig,

here is the published version of my paper:
http://www.mcdougall.org.uk/VM/ISSUE17/I17P3.PDF

Here is the extended version of my paper:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/election-methods-list/files/schulze1.zip

You wrote (29 Jan 2005):
> The words "strictly prefer" are undefined. That is a major problem.

In the published version of my paper, I write that I presume that
each voter casts a partial ranking of all candidates. In the extended
version of my paper, I give a very detailed definition for "partial
rankings". I write:

> It is presumed that each voter casts a partial (i.e. a not necessarily
> complete) ranking of all candidates. Suppose (1) "A >v B" means "voter
> v strictly prefers candidate A to candidate B" and (2) "A =v B" means
> "voter v is indifferent between candidate A and candidate B". Then
> voter v casts a partial ranking when the following six conditions
> are satisfied.
>
> 1. For each pair of candidates A and B exactly
>    one of the following three statements is true:
>    A =v B, A >v B, B >v A.
> 2. A =v A for every candidate A.
> 3. ( A >v B and B >v C ) => A >v C.
> 4. ( A =v B and B >v C ) => A >v C.
> 5. ( A >v B and B =v C ) => A >v C.
> 6. ( A =v B and B =v C ) => A =v C.
>
> However, it is not presumed that each voter casts a complete
> ranking. A complete ranking is a partial ranking with the following
> additional property:
>
> 7. A and B are not identical. => ( A >v B or B >v A ).
>
> Therefore, a possible way to implement the proposed method is to
> give to each voter a complete list of all candidates and to ask each
> voter to rank these candidates in order of preference. The individual
> voter may give the same preference to more than one candidate and he
> may keep candidates unranked. When a given voter does not rank all
> candidates then it is presumed that this voter strictly prefers all
> ranked candidates to all not ranked candidates and that this voter
> is indifferent between all not ranked candidates.

You complain that I call this binary relation "strictly prefer".
However, how I call this binary relation is of no concern as long
as the above properties are satisfied.

Please read:
http://alumnus.caltech.edu/~seppley/Set%20Operators%20and%20Binary%20Relations.htm

*************

You wrote (29 Jan 2005):
> Mr Schulze didn't mention tests that didn't pass his method.

Already in the published version of my paper, I mention that my method
violates participation, mono-add-top, mono-remove-bottom, later-no-help,
and later-no-harm. Furthermore in the extended version of my paper,
I mention that my method also violates consistency, mono-raise-random,
mono-sub-top, mono-raise-delete, mono-sub-plump, and independence from
Pareto-dominated alternatives and that it doesn't guarantee that the
winner is always chosen from the uncovered set.

Markus Schulze