[EM] Rewording Strategy A (BF(1st))

[Russ Paielli]

Russ Paielli 6049awj02-at-sneakemail.com |EMlist| wrote:

> Two different questions can be asked about any voting system:
> 
> 1. What is the best voting strategy?
> 2. How effective is the best voting strategy?
> 
> The fruitcake can't distinguish these two questions, but perhaps others 
> can.
> 
> Let's apply these questions to plurality as an example. The strategy is 
> simple to formulate, but how effective is the strategy? It is very 
> effective if you prefer one of the two major parties, but otherwise it 
> is not very effective.
> 
> You've stated what is perhaps the best strategy for Approval, but how 
> effective is that strategy? Well, in some cases it may be very 
> effective, but in other cases it may not be.
> 
> For example, what if *three* parties are equally popular? Let's take the 
> classic Democrat (D), Republican (R), and Green (G) case. Suppose they 
> are approximately equally likely to win. And suppose your own order of 
> perference is G>D>R. Who do you approve?

I should have also stipulated that you consider D to be roughly halfway 
between G and R in terms of desirability. Obviously if D is much closer 
to one than to the other, your strategy is clearer.

> Well, you could play it safe and approve both G and D. But then you will 
> be disappointed in your choice if it turns out that G could have won had 
> more G>D>R voters not approved D.
> 
> Then again, you could be bold and only approve G. But then you will be 
> even more disappointed if R wins but D had a good chance if only more 
> G>D>R voters had approved D.
> 
> Do you see the dilemma here? The problem is not that you don't have a 
> formula to guide your strategy. The problem is more *fundamental* than 
> that. The problem is that *no* formula can help. Your best strategy is 
> more or less a coin toss.
> 
> And we haven't even got to the case of four competitive parties.