[EM] Re: Comments on Approval posting

[Russ Paielli]

Folks,

I've learned that arguing with Mike is like boxing with one of those 
bottom-heavy balloon-dummies that always right themselves. You just 
can't win. Mike will always get the last word because he apparently has 
nothing else to do but engage in endless pedantry. The only satisfaction 
one can get with Mike is to send him off chasing his own tail endlessly. 
Just for amusement, I'll give it a try.

MIKE OSSIPOFF nkklrp-at-hotmail.com |EMlist| wrote:
> 
> I'd said:
> 
>>  The party that is always CW or at the voter-median would keep winning 
>> at MW equilibrium. Just that one party.
>>
>> But it's true that Approval would fairly deal with any number of 
>> parties. But it wouldn't include them all in a winning equilibrium, 
>> nor should it.
> 
> 
> Russ replied:
> 
> If only one party is popular, then obviously that party will dominate.
> That is true for practically *any* democratic system.
> 
> I reply:
> 
> No, you don't undestand at all. I'll patiently repeat what I said: With 
> Plurality, nearly any 2 parties can keep on being the top votegetters at 
> MW equilibrium. With Approval, if one party is consistently the CW, no 
> other party can win at MW equilibrium. That CW party will soon win, and 
> will keep winning. And no, that is not true of all methods.

What is it that I don't understand, Mike? You forgot to say. You quoted 
two sentences of mine above, and I want to know which you disagree with 
or shows that I "don't understand at all."

Are you claiming that if only one party is "popular," it will not 
"dominate"? Or are you saying that this is not true for "practically any 
democratic system"? Please clarify. I'd really like to know of a 
"democratic system" in which only one party could be popular and yet not 
dominate the elections. That must be a very strange system indeed.

> I'd said:
> 
>>  "Except that now it's much more complicated":   Much more complicated 
>> than what? Than Plurality? It isn't much more complicated, and in fact 
>> it isn't more complicated at all, to vote for the candidate that you'd 
>> vote for in Plurality and also for those whom you like better, as 
>> opposed to just voting in a Plurality election.
> 
> 
> That strategy may be useful only for the first election in which
> Approval Voting is used. After that, it may no longer be useful,
> depending on the results of that first Approval election. We've already
> concluded that Approval can support more than two viable parties, but
> the strategy you stated assumes that two parties are still dominant, as
> under plurality. If that assumption is true, then Approval hasn't made
> much of a difference.
> 
> I reply:
> 
> Russ, you're all confused about this. You need to read about the 
> Approval strategies before expounding about them.

I've read the Approval strategies.

> The Approval strategies that we've been discussing, including the ones 
> that used to be at your website, are intended to deal with uncertainty.

Yes, I realize that they are *intended* to deal with uncertainty, but 
that does *not* mean that they can do so effectively under all (or even 
most) circumstances. And you are the one who is confused if you think 
they can.

Now, when a voter tries to plug into one of your formulas, he must 
somehow translate polling data into probabilities. Perhaps I missed it, 
but I don't recall any guidance from you explaining how to do that. Yet 
that may be the harder part of the problem.

Translating polling data into probabilities involves the mean and the 
variance of the polling data. If either are off, the computed 
probabilities may be useless. In particular, if the error in the mean 
approaches or dominates the error in the variance, then all bets are off.

And what could cause an "error in the mean"? How about 5% of the polled 
sample lying? Or how about 40% of the randomly selected sample not 
responding at all? If I recall the figures, a 40% no-response rate is 
one of the big problems with modern polling. There is really no way to 
properly deal with it, because you have no way of knowing what sorts of 
voters are more likely to refuse to respond.


> Your astounding confusion is revealed when you say that the Best 
> Frontrunner strategy assumes that 2 parties will be "dominant", and that 
> therefore Approval has failed.

No, I never said that. First of all, Approval could have worked wonders 
if a different two parties are dominant than was the case under 
plurality. And even if the same two parties are dominant, that could be 
because they are really the two preferred parties, in which case 
Approval is working fine.

> The BF strategy assumes that the voter has an impression about which 2 
> candidates will be the frontrunners. That doesn't mean that there's a 
> 2-party system, only that there are 2 especially popular candidates, at 
> least in that voter's perception. In any political system, with or 
> without a 2-party system, there will often be reason to expect that a 
> certain candidate will be the biggest votegetter, and that a certain 2 
> cancidates will be the 2 biggest votegetters.

Oh, I see. So what if the top 4 parties are all within 3% of each other? 
Does the "BF" strategy work then? If I recall correctly, you stated flat 
out that the "BF" strategy is valid in general. Is it or isn't it?

> Russ continued:
> 
> In that case, then the strategy of
> "voting for the candidate that you'd vote for in Plurality and also for
> those whom you like better" will still work -- but only because Approval
> hasn't worked as well as hoped by some.
> 
> I reply:
> 
> Wrong. That strategy will "work" for the voter because it will maximize 
> his expectation. It will also work in the sense of quickly homing in on 
> the CW.

Oh, are you claiming that the "BF" strategy is wise even if the top 3 
candidates are in a statistical dead heat? Just for fun, let's say that 
one of them is a Nazi and another is a communist, and these two are one 
percentage point ahead of the others. Should that play into my 
calculation at all? Or should I just blindly use the "BF" strategy?

> I'd said:
> 
>> Actually, a genuine libertarian isn't worse than a Republican. A 
>> genuine libertarian is the opposite of a  Republican on authoritarian 
>> issues. But that's a genuine libertarian, as opposed to an authoritarian.

Mike, you wouldn't know a "genuine" libertarian if one bit you on the ass.

> 
> A "genuine" libertarian would immediately stop all welfare payments,
> aggressively phase out Social Security and Medicare, and end
> "progressive" taxation to make the poor pay their "fair share" of taxes
> (under Bush II, the percentage of the "poor" who pay no federal income
> taxes at all is approaching 40% if I recall correctly).
> 
> Is that "better than a Republican," Mike?
> 
> I reply:
> 
> A genuine libertarian may honestly believe in those policies. If they 
> don't work or aren't publicly accepted, an honest libertarian 
> officeholder will still be more honest than a Republican. So far as I'm 
> aware, the Lilbertarian party isn't bought. Of course the libertarians 
> and Libertarians have policy proposals that I and most others consider a 
> bad idea. But what makes genuine libertarians better than Republicans is 
> their honesty. Also, there are many authoritarian issues on which I 
> agree with the libertarians and Libertarians. I'm referring to 
> libertarians, not you.

"But what makes genuine libertarians better than Republicans is their 
honesty." Anyone who could make a flat assertion like that is profoundly 
confused. But we knew that already, didn't we. You think that the WTC 
couldn't have collapsed as it did without pre-installed explosives.

> In our poll, I ranked the Libertarian candidates below the Republicans, 
> at the bottom, because I felt that it was necessary to assume that you 
> were representative of libertarians. Now I doubt that that is so, 
> especially if Libertarians are libertarian in any meaningful sense of 
> the word.



> Russ continued:
> 
> And while we're at it, would
> you consider approving the Republican to prevent that libertarian
> philosophy from being enacted? Just wondering.
> 
> I reply:
> 
> If Lilbertarians are actually libertarian, I'd probably rank them over 
> the Republicans, because, as I said, libertarians are honest and not 
> bought. In Approval, if the Libertarians are genuinely libertarian and 
> as honest as they now seem, and if they had a chance of winning, and no 
> progressive had a good chance of winning, I'd probably vote, in 
> Approval, for the Libertarians in addition to the progressives.
> 
> But that's an unrealistic scenario: Nader is many times more popular 
> than the Libertarians, and so there wouldn't be a need to do that. 
> Though I'd rank genuine libertarians over the Republicans in Condorcet, 
> in Approval there'd be no need for progressives to vote Libertarian, 
> since Nader & Camejo are so much more popular than the Libertarians.
> 
> I don't mean for any of this to offend genuine libertarians, whose 
> candidates I respect for their honesty, and whom I'd rank over the 
> Republicans and Democrats.
> 
> But if a Libertarian advocated the things that you advocate, that person 
> should be ranked below the Republicans, at the bottom of one's ranking.  
> As I said, that wouldn't be a libertarian in any meaningful sense of the 
> word.

I believe that all drug laws should be repealed. But I also believe that 
the government should not subsidize rehab for addicts. I believe in 
laissez-faire free-market economics. Those are libertarian principles.

Now it is true that many libertarians tend to be more isolationist than 
me on foreign policy. But take a look at what Ayn Rand wrote:

"Dictatorship nations are outlaws. Any free nation had the right to
invade Nazi Germany and, today, has the right to invade Soviet Russia,
Cuba or any other slave pen. Whether a free nation chooses to do so or
not is a matter of its own self-interest, not of respect for the
non-existent "rights" of gang rulers. It is not a free nation's duty to
liberate other nations at the price of self-sacrifice, but a free nation
has the right to do it, when and if it so chooses." --Ayn Rand

Is Ayn Rand enough of a libertarian for you?

> I'd said:
> 
>>  Hardly. The fact that some Approval strategies are  based on 
>> estimates of who will likely be the top-2 votegetters, or on other 
>> probabilities (as opposed to certainties) doesn't lessen its 
>> usefulness as a practical guide for voters.  Some Approval strategies 
>> require more to be estimated than others do. Some require different 
>> things to be estimated. Check the recent postings about Approval 
>> strategy.
> 
> 
> You didn't get my point. My point was that many or most of the
> strategies might not useful when, for example, several parties have
> rough parity, and who is really ahead of whom is unclear.
> 
> I reply:
> 
> Wrong. That was your confused "point" that I was replying to. As I said 
> in the very paragraph that you were replying to there, a number of  
> Approval strategies are intended for dealing with uncertainty. Your 
> "point" is that Approval strategies aren't useful when it's uncertain 
> who is ahead. Your point is all confused, because, as I said in the 
> paragraph that was right in front of your face, a number of Approval 
> strategies are intended for situations of uncertainty.
> 
> You're expouning on something about which you haven't a clue. You need 
> to inform yourself at least a little before posting.

Mike, you are a pathetic amateur who imagines himself a professional. 
You're some kind of idiot savant. And you're the most pedantic person I 
have ever encountered. I am amazed that this forum puts up with your 
arrogance and delusions of grandeur. Apparently they're more "tolerant" 
than me.

--Russ