[EM] Comments on Approval posting

[Russ Paielli]

MIKE OSSIPOFF nkklrp-at-hotmail.com |EMlist| wrote:
> 
> Russ continued:
> 
> Approval, on the other hand, will not necessarily reach a stable
> equilibrium with only two dominant parties.
> 
> I comment:
> 
> ?With Approval, if there's a party that's always voter-median or CW, 
> there will be a stable equilibrium with _one_ party--the CW or voter 
> median party.
> 
> ERuss continued:
> 
> If I understand it
> correctly, it could allow any number of parties to reach a stable state
> of parity.
> 
> I reply:
> 
>  The party that is always CW or at the voter-median would keep winning 
> at MW equilibrium. Just that one party.
> 
> But it's true that Approval would fairly deal with any number of 
> parties. But it wouldn't include them all in a winning equilibrium, nor 
> should it.

If only one party is popular, then obviously that party will dominate. 
That is true for practically *any* democratic system. And obviously no 
election method should include any party in a "winning equilibrium" 
unless that party is popular with the electorate.

The important point is that, under Approval, *more* than *two* parties 
can compete more or less equally on the basis of the public perception 
of their *merits*. In other words, no party will face an insurmountable 
handicap merely because they are not expected to win.

> Russ continued:
> 
> But I see a potential problem. If several parties reach parity,
> strategic voting becomes difficult, and the voter could end up with very
> difficult decisions. Do Greens approve the Democrat as a hedge against
> the Republican, or do they not? It's the same old problem, except now
> it's much more complicated.
> 
> I comment:
> 
> Same old problem, yes. It can be summarized by saying that Approval has 
> strategy to a greater extent than Condorcet does. That's the difference 
> between Approval & Condorcet.
> 
>  "Except that now it's much more complicated":   Much more complicated 
> than what? Than Plurality? It isn't much more complicated, and in fact 
> it isn't more complicated at all, to vote for the candidate that you'd 
> vote for in Plurality and also for those whom you like better, as 
> opposed to just voting in a Plurality election.

That strategy may be useful only for the first election in which 
Approval Voting is used. After that, it may no longer be useful, 
depending on the results of that first Approval election. We've already 
concluded that Approval can support more than two viable parties, but 
the strategy you stated assumes that two parties are still dominant, as 
under plurality. If that assumption is true, then Approval hasn't made 
much of a difference.

It is possible, of course, that the "Republicrats" will still be 
dominant for a while -- perhaps a long while -- after Approval is 
instituted. After all, they have massive political "machinery" and 
muscle. And many voters will favor them for a long time by virtue of 
sheer inertia and "tradition." In that case, then the strategy of 
"voting for the candidate that you'd vote for in Plurality and also for 
those whom you like better" will still work -- but only because Approval 
hasn't worked as well as hoped by some.

> Russ continued:
> 
> As a
> matter of fact, they may need to think about approving the *Republican*
> to prevent the *Libertartian* from getting elected! Or vice versa.
> 
> I comment:
> 
> Actually, a genuine libertarian isn't worse than a Republican. A genuine 
> libertarian is the opposite of a  Republican on authoritarian issues. 
> But that's a genuine libertarian, as opposed to an authoritarian.

A "genuine" libertarian would immediately stop all welfare payments, 
aggressively phase out Social Security and Medicare, and end 
"progressive" taxation to make the poor pay their "fair share" of taxes 
(under Bush II, the percentage of the "poor" who pay no federal income 
taxes at all is approaching 40% if I recall correctly).

Is that "better than a Republican," Mike? And while we're at it, would 
you consider approving the Republican to prevent that libertarian 
philosophy from being enacted? Just wondering.

> Russ continued:
> 
> The Approval strategy "formulas" that have been put forth are
> interesting, but in many cases they will be of no practical use to
> voters. Why? Because they are based on how other voters are expected to
> vote, which is obviously uncertain. The best strategic cutoff point
> could depend critically on that uncertain information, in which case the
> formulas will be useless as a practical guide for voters.
> 
> I comment:
> 
>  Hardly. The fact that some Approval strategies are  based on estimates 
> of who will likely be the top-2 votegetters, or on other probabilities 
> (as opposed to certainties) doesn't lessen its usefulness as a practical 
> guide for voters.  Some Approval strategies require more to be estimated 
> than others do. Some require different things to be estimated. Check the 
> recent postings about Approval strategy.

You didn't get my point. My point was that many or most of the 
strategies might not useful when, for example, several parties have 
rough parity, and who is really ahead of whom is unclear.

Just because I can write down the dynamic equations for tumbling dice, 
that does not mean I can use them to throw snake eyes on demand.

> Some ways of voting in Approval don't require probabilities to be 
> estimated. Those too are discussed in recent EM postings.
> 
>  It's obvious that if we only adopt for puiblic elections methods which 
> have been tested by use in public elections, we're pretty much stuck 
> with what is currently used in public elections. That's fine if you like 
> what's currently in use.

Yes, that *is* obvious, which makes me wonder why you said it. I never 
implied that Approval shouldn't be used because it hasn't been tested 
extensively in public elections. That lack of testing, however, leads 
humble people to be cautious. You never know what surprises reality 
might spring on you.

> Anyone arguing that Approval or CR might be worse than the Plurality 
> currently in use would have to explain why Approval's or CR's added 
> freedoms, freedoms that they add to what's allowed in Plurality, would 
> make them worse than Plurality.

Well, yes and no. I think the "burden of proof" should be on the person 
proposing a radical change to something so fundamental to democracy 
itself. But the "burden of proof" shouldn't be unreasonably high.

--Russ

When people find they can vote themselves money, that will herald the 
end of the Republic. --Benjamin Franklin