[EM] approval strategy

[Russ Paielli]

Russ Paielli 6049awj02-at-sneakemail.com |EMlist| wrote:

> Voter strategy in Approval will be simple at first, but it could become 
> very difficult later. Simple formulas are nice, but they cannot resolve 
> the dilemma that voters could eventually face.
> 
> Let's say that Approval has just been adopted. Well, Greens will vote 
> for their Green candidate plus the Democrat and everyone else they 
> prefer to the Democrat. That's the easy part.
> 
> But now let's say that Approval has been in use for several election 
> cycles, and the Green is starting to catch up to the Democrat. Well, the 
> Green Party will certainly urge their supporters to drop their vote for 
> that pesky Democrat. But if they take the advice, they risk handing the 
> election over to the Republicans, of course.

I'm replying to myself because I would like to expand on the point I was 
making.

A couple of proposals were made to alleviate the voting dilemma I 
pointed out above. I did not reply to them because I honestly don't know 
if they will work or not. I do know, however, that they compromise the 
ultra-simplicity of Approval, which will make them harder to get 
adopted. That certainly does not mean they are not worth discussing, 
just that I'd like to focus on Approval and IRV for now.

At ElectionMethods.org I wrote an article on IRV that attempts to 
explain its deficiencies. It says that IRV works fine until a third 
party becomes truly competitive, at which point it more or less breaks 
down. The voters will sense that and will not let the situation get to 
that point. Many minor-party supporters will insincerely vote the 
"lesser of two evils" as their top pick, and we will be more or less in 
the same situation as with plurality, except that the effect of 
small-percentage spoilers (e.g., Nader 2000) will be removed.

Well, call me slow, but I am starting to realize that Approval has the 
very same problem. As soon as a third party starts truly competing, 
supporters of that party must decide when to drop their vote for the 
"lesser of two evils." It's basically the same decision they must 
ultimately make in IRV as to when to finally take the plunge and put 
their real party at the top of the list.

So is Approval really any better than IRV? Well, Approval *is* 
considerably simpler than IRV, which a major factor for public 
acceptability. And it *is* monotonic, which obviously desirable. And it 
is "summable," which greatly simplifies implementation and reduces 
security risks. Approval clearly has a lot going for it over IRV. But 
when push comes to shove, how effective will it really be at giving 
"minor" parties a chance to actually get elected?

If Approval is ever adopted, prepare for some irate voters who pull back 
too early on their vote for the "lesser of two evils" and have it 
backfire on them. After they get burned on that one, many of them will 
go back to their old ways and the duopoly could be back as strong as 
ever. Or so it seems to me. Am I wrong?

--Russ