[EM] Re: majority rule criteria--alternative nomenclature

[RLSuter at aol.com]

James,

I wish you would read and think more carefully before
you respond.

You wrote (quoting me):

>in  some situations (especially small
>informal groups needing to make quick decisions),
>approval is far and away the best method -- indeed,
>the only very good method that I'm aware of.

     If these are not high-stakes decisions, then yes,
I can see how approval could be applicable. Ideally, you
would like to find an option that is approved-of by all
members of the group. But once the decision becomes
important and/or contentious enough that majority rule
becomes necessary, then I think that approval is no
longer ideal. Better would be some kind of
Condorcet-efficient procedure, either using a
ranked ballot or iterative votes.

My reply:

Are you really incapable of imagining what I might mean
by an "informal group needing to make quick decisions"?
Are you really incapable of imagining that it's possible
that even a "high stakes" decision may sometimes need to
be made so quickly (e.g., during an emergency in which
lives are at stake) that time consuming ranked ballots
are out of the question and that in such situations
approval voting is by far the best option? If there is
a better option for such situations, then please tell
me what it is.


You wrote:

>Now if you and Steven Brams were to debate approval voting
>and you were to persuade all or most people attending the
>debate that he has been a fool for advocating it all these
>years, then I might change my mind. But I really doubt that
>you could do that. My guess is that if you tried in such
>a debate to argue that approval is only marginally better
>than plurality, Brams would prove that it is you, not he,
>who deserves to be called a fool.

     Okay, this is kind of lame, defending your opinion
by hiding behind someone whose arguments you don't fully
understand. If I told you that Einstein thought that
approval voting was worthless, but I don't really know why
he thought that, would it make my argument any better?

My reply

Do you understand what a debate is? I'm not hiding behind
anyone. I'm envisioning a debate between the long-time
leading academic advocate and co-inventor of approval
voting and someone else (you) who thinks approval voting
is close to worthless. If approval voting is to be debated,
it is only reasonable that it be debated by people like
Brams and you who are very knowledgeable about voting
methods. Even if I agreed with you about approval voting,
it would make more sense for you rather than me to debate
Brams. An even more interesting debate would be a 3-way
one that included Rob Richie of CVD or another IRV
advocate who dislikes approval as much as you but thinks
IRV is the best method.


You wrote:

>Ultimately, whether or not approval or other methods are
>"majority" methods is a question of debatable definitions.

     Right, that's what I'm doing here: discussing those
definitions. I think that it's important to note the ways
that methods like approval, CR, and Borda do not guarantee
majority rule. If you don't think that it's important,
then feel free to stop discussing it with me.

My reply:

You know as well as I do that no method will "guarantee"
majority rule under all situations and voting conditions
unless you define "majority rule" in a arbitrary way that
favors the voting methods you prefer.


You wrote:

>If approval voting would result in a Condorcet winner
>95% of the time (just a guess, of course), that would be
>sufficient for many people who are less perfectionistic
>than you to regard it as a majority method.

     Is plurality a majority rule method? Some people
might say that it is, but I think that they're wrong,
because it fails the mutual majority criterion. I think
that it's important to differentiate between majoritarian
and non-majoritarian methods.

My response:

You failed to address my point. If, in actual voting
situations with all their uncertainties resulting from
potential human error, approval voting resulted in a
Condorcet winner as often or nearly as often as your
favorite ranked ballot method, how could you insist that
approval is not a "majority rule method" and your method
is? If all you care about is hypothetical "perfect world"
scenarios, fine, but the only problems I'm interested
in right now are real world ones, especially ones with
serious human consequences that urgently need to be
solved or at least made less serious than they are now.


You wrote:

>Moreover, any process for making collective decisions,
>including plurality voting and even some random selection
>processes, could be considered a majority process if
>it were chosen by a majority of voters and they agreed
>beforehand to accept the outcome of the process.

     That's a stretch.

My response:

It's a stretch only if you have not given it any serious
thought to it. You clearly have not. Why should citizens
not be permitted to vote on voting methods themselves?
If a 2/3 majority were to decide to go with plurality and
agree to accept the winner, who is to say they should not
be allowed to do so, provided opponents of plurality are
permitted to debate the issue prior to the vote, and
provided the issue is revisited from time to time so
that citizens have a chance to change their minds in
the future?


You wrote:

>In fact, I believe there are many situations where voter
>approved random selection processes, especially ones
>modified to insure proportional representation by
>qualifiedpeople of major ethnic and other interest groups,
>would bepreferable to elections, no matter what voting
>method were used. But that's a subject for another
>discussion.

     Yikes. Ethnic groups and interest groups? I really
disagree there. Gives everyone an incentive to form their
own interest group, which is not something I want at all.
More importantly, it artificially perpetuates feelings
of "otherness" that are a primary cause of mistrust,
prejudice, etc. I know that they have this in some
countries, and I can see its value, but in the long run,
I don't think that it's ideal. If you want a system that
doesn't impose a tyranny of the majority, I suggest a
fluid system of proportional representation based on
single transferable vote, plus supermajority requirements
for a lot of the major decisions.


My response:

Again you have replied without bothering to carefully read
what I said. You entirely skipped over the word "major"
before "ethnic and other interest groups." Sure, anyone
can form their own interest group (and people often do),
but to form a "major" one is a lot easier said than
done. As to how best to deal with the problem of
representation in "many different situations," there are
many possibilities that you clearly have not given even a
moment's thought to. Until you do, your dismissive comments
are nearly worthless. I'd like to recommend a couple
of books you should read if you are really interested
informing yourself about this subject. One is "Is Democracy
Possible?" by John Burnheim (U. of Cal. Press, 1985).
The other is "Random Selection in Politics" by Lyn Carson
and Brian Martin (Praeger, 1999). Neither these nor any
other books I could recommend have all the answers, but
they will force you confront problems involved with
collective decisionmaking that you clearly have never
confronted until now. As for the general problem of
representation, it is much more complicated and debatable
than you are apparently aware. This is a subject I would
like to study more but (as with many others) haven't had
nearly enough time. One recent academic article that
looks very worthwhile is "Rethinking Representation"
by Jane Manstridge in American Political Science Review
97.4 (December 2003).

-Ralph Suter