[EM] majority rule criteria

[Kevin Venzke]

James,

 --- James Green-Armytage <jarmyta at antioch-college.edu> a écrit : 
> Yes, it's true that "majority rule" is an ambiguous term, and so there is
> no one 'correct' definition. However, I find some definitions more useful
> than others. Let me suggest 4 general categories of majority rule methods,
> based on 4 basic criteria.
> 
> Criterion 1: If a majority of the electorate coordinates their efforts,
> they can assure that a given candidate is elected, or that another given
> candidate is not elected. [Plurality, Pseudomajority methods]
> Criterion 2: Mutual majority criterion
> Criterion 3: Condorcet efficiency
> Criterion 4: Minimal dominant set (Smith, GeTChA) efficiency

Wow, I don't think these are very useful for classification. Criterion 1
says almost nothing. Criterion 2 (Majority) also guarantees little. Condorcet
and Smith guarantee a lot, but aren't all that different. I'm amazed you
didn't take the opportunity to distinguish Approval and Borda from FPP due
to Majority Favorite.

You can't very well cram WDSC (which guarantees a lot, I would say) into
this scheme, because it isn't implied by any of your criteria.

Reading your own justifications for these criteria (below) makes me think
this scheme is flawed, since I can't imagine IRV outperforming Approval in
these respects (e.g. facilitating a "process of revelation").

> You are correct in saying that in pseudomajority methods (like plurality
> and range voting), a given majority of the electorate *can* coordinate
> their intentions and decide the winner, but this merely postpones the
> question of how they do this. The stronger majority methods not only
> enable firmly coordinated majorities to assert themselves, but they allow
> majorities to *reveal* themselves, with out any need for prior
> coordination. I think that voting methods that facilitate this process of
> revelation are superior to those that do not.
> 
> The remaining three categories allow mutual majorities to reveal
> themselves (in the absence of a self-defeating strategy by supporters of
> this majority). Strong majority rule methods not only reveal mutual
> majorities, but they reveal minimal dominant sets and Condorcet winners
> (in the absence of a severe burying strategy). This is especially valuable
> because it means revealing possible compromises on divisive issues, thus
> avoiding a lot of political polarization and strife. 
> 
> As you have said, many progressive policies may be supported by a
> majority, but they have not been brought to a fair vote. A major goal of a
> good voting system is to *reveal* these majority-supported policies, to
> avoid their getting lost in the noise of the two party system. Can they be
> revealed if we use a pseudomajority method like range voting? Yes, it's
> quite possible, but it's more difficult.

Kevin Venzke



	

	
		
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