[EM] Re: Range Voting
Forest Simmons
simmonfo at up.edu
Fri Jan 7 16:52:08 PST 2005
>Date: Fri, 07 Jan 2005 08:31:30 -0800
>From: Mike <mrouse1 at mrouse.com>
>Subject: [EM] Thanks to a couple of list members (Condorcet/Range
> completion method)
>I'd like to thank Chris Benham for providing me the links to James
>Green-Armytage's site, which answered a lot of my questions.
>
>I might as well ask another question, since this one went so well: Has
>anyone tried replacing Borda with Range voting in methods like Borda
>elimination or Nanson to see what the properties and paradoxes were?
>
Mike, sequential elimination always introduces the same basic strategy
problem that IRV has: you attempt to help a compromise candidate
survive to the last round at the expense of candidates that you prefer,
because you have reason to fear that your favorite(s) would not fare as
well in the last round as your compromise.
To counter this problem the idea of "Runoff Without Elimination" has
been proposed independently by various people (even Donald, of all
people).
RWE requires that in the final stage, all of the candidates who have
been eliminated are put back into the pool. The runoff stages are just
for gathering information about relative probable success of the
candidates.
For example, you could do the runoff that you suggest, and then (after
your final stage) put all of the candidates back in the pool, and
calculate an approval cutoff on each ballot based on a weighted average
of the candidate ratings on that ballot. The weights (for example)
could be proportional to the square (for example) of the number of
stages survived by the respective candidates.
There is no particular incentive to have your favorite survive too many
rounds, since the one who survives the most rounds is squarely in the
cross hairs of the other candidates.
Another RWE method would be to use Random Ballot Dutta to get the
weights:
Temporarily cross off all candidates except the members of the Banks
set or Dutta set. Do a symmetric completion of these ballots so that
each revised ballot has exactly one Dutta candidate in first place. Use
the first place counts on these revised ballots as weights (for
approval cutoff calculation) on the original ballots.
What if there is only one member of the Dutta set? That's a nice
problem.
I think it would be hard to improve on the performance of this method,
but it would probably be a harder sell than a simpler version of RWE.
Check out Kevin's "Gradual Information Approval" for a simple,
appealing method. In the k_th stage the top n-k approval getters from
the previous stage are given equal positive weight for an approval
vote. In the last (n-2) stage, only two candidates have positive
weight for the cutoff calculation (so on each ballot the cutoff is
halfway between them) but the other candidates are still in the action.
"Where there's life, there is hope."
Forest
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