[EM] Re: Random thought on Range Voting

[Rob LeGrand]

Brian Olson wrote:
> I think it's been shown that the optimum strategy is not to
> vote-for-one (plurality) on a ratings ballot, but to vote
> max-rating for any choice above some threshold internal to you,
> and min-rating for the rest. Thus straight cumulative vote
> degenerates to Approval under strategy (not plurality).

You're talking about Range Voting, which is indeed strategically
equivalent to Approval.  Cumulative voting allows you to distribute
a fixed number of votes among the candidates any way you wish.  A
strategic voter will pile his votes on one candidate.

> I think the answer is to tinker with the counting on the back
> end, not make limits on how a voter can vote. Systems like
> "Instant Runoff Normalized Ratings", or James Green-Armytage's
> ratings-based Condorcet cycle-break method solve the immediate
> shortcomings of the straight cumulative vote, and still provide
> the satisfaction of an expressive ballot.

I prefer a DSV approach, at least for an informed and intelligent
electorate.  For public elections, I like plain Approval for its
simplicity and limited manipulability.

> Everyone wants to limit what someone else can do so that they
> can't cheat? Maybe it's just me but that sounds somehow socially
> cynical.

Well, I'm talking about holier-than-thou voters who would vote
sincerely no matter what and want (in their minds) to keep others
from taking advantage.

> Hmm, recast Approval as not "some number of yes votes", because
> that violates some people's sense of one-person-one-vote, but
> instead "a yes/no vote per choice".

I think some major-party voters would still want to keep others
from voting for many candidates, but it's hard to tell what would
happen.

=====
Rob LeGrand, psephologist
rob at approvalvoting.org
Citizens for Approval Voting
http://www.approvalvoting.org/


	
		
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