[EM] Re: Range Voting

[Kevin Venzke]

Brian,

 --- Brian Olson <bql at bolson.org> a écrit : 
> >> If a majority of all the voters prefer X to Y, then they should have 
> >> a way of voting that ensures that Y won't win, without any member of 
> >> that majority voting a less-liked candidate over a more-liked one.
> 
> I think IRNR has this. I think IRNR is a strict improvement on straight 
> Cardinal Rating summation, except for the computational burden.

I'm not so sure about this... What if X is the majority faction's fifth
choice? It is easy to imagine X being eliminated in this case, only a
little harder to imagine Y going on to win. Maybe that can't happen,
though.

IRNR is one of the methods I've programmed using Forest's information
on producing triangles to draw all the results for a method using three
ballot types. One alarming thing I noticed is that IRNR doesn't always
elect a majority favorite. Suppose the ballot types are A, B, and C>B.
Even if the C>B faction makes up a majority, they can get C eliminated by
giving B too high of a score.

Kevin Venzke



	

	
		
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