[EM] Re: Is range voting the panacea we need?

[FL]

On Mon, 03 Jan 2005 00:26:05 +1030, Chris Benham
<chrisbenham at bigpond.com> wrote:
> Florian Legyel asked me (Sat.Jan1):
> 
> >What is the sensible and fair argument linking the minimization of
> >Bayesian regret by range voting with the emotional states of voters?
> >
> CB: I  could perhaps have omitted the word  "Bayesian", because that
> just refers to "averaged over a vast number of
> randomized elections".

It's better to be more specific about what is being averaged: WD
Smith's simulations assign, for each voter and candidate, the utility
a given candidate has for that voter.
This is not an "emotion"--it is, in Smith's simulation, a real number
between 0 and 1.
The "Baysean regret" assigned by a voter to an election is the
difference between the
utility assigned to the winning candidate by that voter and his
preferred candidate; these differences are averaged in the simulations
of each voting method.
 
>  Ok, suppose there are two candidates  and three voters, and the voting
> method is Range Voting
> using the scale 0-100. All three voters are completely sincere.
> 
> Voters 1 and 2  both prefer candidate A to candidate B, but not by much
> and they are not very impressed by either. They
> vote  A27, B25.   Voter 3, on the other hand,  is infatuated  with B and
> thinks that A is by comparison terrible, so votes
> A2, B98.  This is how W.D Smith measures "regret" in his simulations.

Could you point out in the simulations where this is? I see no mention of the
utility assignments in WD Smith's program in this account.

> Range Voting would just add up the points and elect B, minimizing
> "regret". Voter 3 over-ruled the other two voters, by
> being more emotional.  "Regret" is an emotion, isn't it?  

This seems to sidestep the technical definition of Bayesian regret with 
extra-mathematical psychological considerations. The issue is not
whether regret
is an emotion. Bayesian regret is  a term for the difference in utility a 
hypothetical voter would assign to two candidates. Smith's simulation
makes the assumption that voters make such utility assignments. He
also allows voters to
be ignorant of the "real" utility a candidate has, by introducing a
random deviation from
the "true" value.  A question is whether such assumptions are
sociologically and politically
substantive.

Voter 3's
> greater  self-quantified  potential "regretfulness" (96 points
> of it)  over-ruled the other two voters'  total of  4 points of
> potential regret.
> 
> That is why I say that the assertion by Range Voter advocates that
>  "minimizing...regret" is more important than majority
> rule is tantamount to saying that more emotional voters should have more
> power than less emotional voters.
> 
> Chris Benham

I don't believe WD Smith ever asserted that minimizing Bayesian regret
is more important
than majority rule. His statement was that range voting minimizes
Bayesian regret--it's a statement about a simulation of voting methods
assuming some kind of a priori assignment of utilities each voter in
an election assigns to a list of candidates. The three-voter example
you give does not involve a minimization over a distribution of
candidate utility assignments by the voters. Perhaps it would be a
good idea to run the simulation with three voters.

FL