[EM] Dave reply

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

Dave--

I'd said:

>Approval also has disadvantages in its comparison with IRV. They have 
>already been pointed out, and much discussed on EM.  Of course discuss them 
>more if you want to , but they've already been pointed out. Or, of course, 
>point out new ones.

You replied:

Said as if IRV is radically different from Condorcet.  Agreed that the
methods of counting ballots differ in detail but, considering that they
usually agree as to winner, are the result differences that big?  Note:
     IRV has a spoiler problem, though not as often as Plurality.
     Condorcet cycles can annoy when they occur.

I reply:

Sure, Condorcet's cycles will bother some. But, in terms of results, in 
terms of criteria guarantees, Condorcet is very much different from IRV, and 
very much better.

Sometimes IRV will give the Condorcet result. Sometimes we might not be so 
lucky.


You continued:

     BUT the voter's actions, such as strategy, have to be based on what
is practical for voters to learn and use (it is too easy for EM members
to design strategies that sound nice in EM debates, while not practical
for public election voters to either get the data or process it).

I reply:

Of course we're very aware of that. That's why our favorite Approval 
strategy to tell people is:

Vote for whom you would in Plurality, and for everyone whom you like better.

That's not complicated, but it's perfectly good for maximizing expectation 
in Approval, and for quicklyl homing in on the CW. And no one need ever bury 
their favorite again.

Mike Ossipoff

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