[EM] Comments on Approval posting

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

  I wasn't going to disagree with anything Russ posted, because I didn't 
want to seem to be picking on him, or argumentative. But, after a few of his 
postings, I finally decided that any posting that says misleading things can 
fairly and properly  be commented on.

Russ said:

Like plurality, IRV tends to reach a stable equilibrium with two
dominant parties.

I comment:

With Plurality, nearly any 2 parties can keep remaining the two top 
votegetters at Myerson-Weber equilibrium. MW equilibrium is only defined for 
point systems such as Plurality Approval, CR, & Borda, but it's also true 
that IRV, lilke Plurality, would tend to stably protect the perceived 
top-two, as Plurality does.

Russ continued:

Approval, on the other hand, will not necessarily reach a stable
equilibrium with only two dominant parties.

I comment:

?With Approval, if there's a party that's always voter-median or CW, there 
will be a stable equilibrium with _one_ party--the CW or voter median party.

ERuss continued:

If I understand it
correctly, it could allow any number of parties to reach a stable state
of parity.

I reply:

  The party that is always CW or at the voter-median would keep winning at 
MW equilibrium. Just that one party.

But it's true that Approval would fairly deal with any number of parties. 
But it wouldn't include them all in a winning equilibrium, nor should it.

Russ continued:

But I see a potential problem. If several parties reach parity,
strategic voting becomes difficult, and the voter could end up with very
difficult decisions. Do Greens approve the Democrat as a hedge against
the Republican, or do they not? It's the same old problem, except now
it's much more complicated.

I comment:

Same old problem, yes. It can be summarized by saying that Approval has 
strategy to a greater extent than Condorcet does. That's the difference 
between Approval & Condorcet.

  "Except that now it's much more complicated":   Much more complicated than 
what? Than Plurality? It isn't much more complicated, and in fact it isn't 
more complicated at all, to vote for the candidate that you'd vote for in 
Plurality and also for those whom you like better, as opposed to just voting 
in a Plurality election.

Russ continued:

Now Greens may need to worry about letting
the Libertarian get elected if they don't vote for the Democrat.

I comment:

Again, this is nothing other than a re-statement of Approval's strategy 
situiation, as it's always been discussed here.

I and some others have very recently posted here about strategies for 
Approval. These strategies are ways of deciding the question that you're 
asking. They're ways of dealing with the strategy situation that you 
describe, the strategy situation that has always characterized Approval 
voting.

Russ continued:

As a
matter of fact, they may need to think about approving the *Republican*
to prevent the *Libertartian* from getting elected! Or vice versa.

I comment:

Actually, a genuine libertarian isn't worse than a Republican. A genuine 
libertarian is the opposite of a  Republican on authoritarian issues. But 
that's a genuine libertarian, as opposed to an authoritarian.

Russ continued:

The bottom line is that the election could be tipped in any of several
different directions depending on where voters decide to "draw the line"
between their approved and disapproved candidates.

I comment:

Check the recent EM messages. There's been discussion about that very 
question: Where to draw the line in Approval.

Russ continued:

Maybe this is
obvious, but I wonder how many have really thought about the potential
consequences.

  I comment:

Well,we've pretty much been discussing it quite a bit.

Russ continued:

I am not claiming that the disadvantages of Approval
outweigh the advantages; I'm merely pointing out the potential problems.

I comment:

Condorcet has advantages over Approval, and many, for good reason, prefer 
Condorcet to Approval.
Approval has advantages over Condorcet, including some merit advantages over 
Condorcet.

Approval also has disadvantages in its comparison with IRV. They have 
already been pointed out, and much discussed on EM.  Of course discuss them 
more if you want to , but they've already been pointed out. Or, of course, 
point out new ones.

Russ continued:

The Approval strategy "formulas" that have been put forth are
interesting, but in many cases they will be of no practical use to
voters. Why? Because they are based on how other voters are expected to
vote, which is obviously uncertain. The best strategic cutoff point
could depend critically on that uncertain information, in which case the
formulas will be useless as a practical guide for voters.

I comment:

  Hardly. The fact that some Approval strategies are  based on estimates of 
who will likely be the top-2 votegetters, or on other probabilities (as 
opposed to certainties) doesn't lessen its usefulness as a practical guide 
for voters.  Some Approval strategies require more to be estimated than 
others do. Some require different things to be estimated. Check the recent 
postings about Approval strategy.

Some ways of voting in Approval don't require probabilities to be estimated. 
Those too are discussed in recent EM postings.

  It's obvious that if we only adopt for puiblic elections methods which 
have been tested by use in public elections, we're pretty much stuck with 
what is currently used in public elections. That's fine if you like what's 
currently in use.

Anyone arguing that Approval or CR might be worse than the Plurality 
currently in use would have to explain why Approval's or CR's added 
freedoms, freedoms that they add to what's allowed in Plurality, would make 
them worse than Plurality.

Mike Ossipoff

_________________________________________________________________
FREE pop-up blocking with the new MSN Toolbar – get it now! 
http://toolbar.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200415ave/direct/01/