[EM] majority rule criteria--alternative nomenclature

[James Green-Armytage]

Ralph, you objected to the term "pseudomajority methods" for
non-majoritarian single-winner methods, on the grounds that it was too
derogatory. So, how about "plurality methods" instead? This is appropriate
for methods like approval, range, and Borda, because what matter is who
has the highest cumulative score, rather than which candidates are
preferred by a majority over which other candidates. In that case, I would
update my single-winner classification system as follows:

Criterion 1: If a majority of the electorate coordinates their efforts,
they can assure that a given candidate is elected, or that another given
candidate is not elected.
Criterion 2: Mutual majority criterion
Criterion 3: Condorcet efficiency
Criterion 4: Minimal dominant set (Smith, GeTChA) efficiency

Criterion 1 only: Plurality methods.
Criteria 1 and 2 only: Weak majority rule methods / mutual majority
methods.
Criteria 1, 2, and 3: Intermediate majority rule methods / Condorcet
methods
Criteria 1, 2, 3, and 4: Strong majority rule methods / strong Condorcet
methods / top cycle methods

Plurality methods: Plurality, approval, range voting, Borda
Mutual majority methods: single-winner STV
Condorcet methods: Minimax (aka SD, PC, etc.), Nanson, Black, etc.
Strong Condorcet methods: ranked pairs, beatpath, river, cardinal pairwise
(assuming that a strong-majority base method is used)

Sincerely,
James Green-Armytage
http://fc.antioch.edu/~james_green-armytage/voting.htm
http://fc.antioch.edu/~jarmyta@antioch-college.edu/voting.htm