[EM] majority rule criteria and you

[James Green-Armytage]

Mike,

I've just written a message about majority rule criteria in reply to your
message, but I haven't yet placed your own definition in my little
hierarchy. I will attempt to do that now.

You wrote:
>That depends on what you mean by a majority-rule method. You define it
>below 
>as a Smith-Criterion method, but you mustn't expect others to share that 
>definition. Range-Voting, which I call CR, meets WDSC, which says:
>If a majority of all the voters prefer X to Y, they should have a way of 
>voting that ensures that Y won't win, without any member of that majority 
>voting a less-liked candidate over a more-liked one.
>[end of WDSC definition]

This is, in essence, a slightly stronger version of my criterion 1 from
the last message. 
(Criterion 1: If a majority of the electorate coordinates their efforts,
they can assure that a given candidate is elected, or that another given
candidate is not elected.)

The main difference is that this majority, having coordinated their
intentions, can enforce their will without reversing a sincere ordinal
preference (although you allow them to neglect to report some
preferences). However, although they can enforce their will this way, the
process of coordinating intentions is left up to some other method.

You wrote:
>
>When a majority can easily nsure the defeat of a candidate, they can
>enforce 
>majority rule. CR is a majority-rule method by that reasonable standard.

They can enforce it if they already know what the majority wants. Learning
what the majority wants is one of the main purposes of single-winner
voting. Hence, in my opinion, CR only does part of what a majority rule
method should do.

	So, in conclusion, I'd still like to classify range voting as a
pseudomajority method, although it is surely superior to plurality
(another pseudomajority method), for the reasons that you have stated. 

Sincerely,
James Green-Armytage

P.S., I (James) had written:
>In some non-contentious election
>scenarios, perhaps it can be. But in a contentious election, it is not. If
>a Condorcet winner is not elected, it does not necessarily mean that
>another candidate had a higher utility. More likely, it means that
>supporters of the other candidate pulled off a successful strategy. The
>interpersonal utility comparison aspect of range voting is just too easy
>to hijack for strategic purposes, so that it essentially becomes
>meaningless in a contentious election.
>
You (Mike) replied:
>Not at all. As I said, you can vote strategically in CR if you choose to,
> 
>to protect the CW &/or majority rule.
>
I'm not sure that you got my meaning. Basically, what I was saying is that
in non-contentious situations, people could use the range voting ratings
to express actual utility levels, but in contentious situations, people
will probably use them mostly for strategy... therefore, in contentious
situations, the method is no longer useful/meaningful as a measurement of
utility.