[EM] Re: To Chris, about Range-Voting

MIKE OSSIPOFF nkklrp at hotmail.com
Sat Jan 8 20:17:21 PST 2005



Chris--

You wrote:

On top of that
Condorcet (Margins)  meets  Condorcet.

I reply:

...which doesn't mean much. When Condorcet's Criterion (CC) is defined so 
that it applies uniformly to all methods, and Plurality fails it, it says:

  If everyone votes sincerely [or insincere voting isn't widespread enough 
to affect the oiutcome], and if there's a CW, then that CW should win.

[end of better CC definition]

So CC, when written meaningfully, applies when [at least effecively] 
everyone votes sincerely, as I've defined sincere voting on EM. Not a very 
widely applicable criterion, then.  The defensive strategy criteria, in 
contradistinction, allow for strategy, and in fact are about the degree of 
strategy that is needed, and the range of conditions under which it is 
needed.

So, when CR & Approval fail CC (as defined above), and Margins Condorcet 
fails WDSC & FBC,
I suggests that Margins Condorcet's failure is much more of a failure.

But of course CC isn't usually defined as I've defined it above. CC is 
usually defined in such a way that one of the following statements is true:

1. Approval & Plurality pass CC.
2. All methods fail CC.
33. We make Plurality fail CC by iincluding in CC's requirement a 
requirement that the method be a
    rank-balloting method.
4. We make Plurality not pass CC by stipulating in CC's definition that it 
doesn't apply to nonranked
    methods.
5. We, for some methods, make special counterfactual assumptions about those 
methods. That's
    an especially sloppy patch for CC.

Solutions 1 & 2 at least have honest consistency. Solutions 3, 4, & 5 
require a CC that applies by different rules  to different methods. 
Differen't CCs for different methods. An advocate of solution #5  was even  
unable to tell me how CC should apply to Approval.

My CC applies uniformly to all methods, with no special stipulations or 
assumptions. And Approval & Plurality fail that CC for the reason why we'd 
expect them to fail CC.

You continued:

I'd said:

    Agreed. They're only voting one point of difference in a 100 point range 
election.


CB: If   the 99  voters  don't  "want to be heard", then why are they
bothering to vote?
I reply:

Why do you care? Isn't that their business, in a democracy? They have a very 
slight preference, and they choose to express that fact.

Take this example:


2:  A7, B6
1:  B100, A0.

(Ralph Suter can multiply these numbers by 5 million, if that will make
him happy.)  The two A supporters are very
religious, and they have resolved to reserve the maximum possible rating
of 100 for the second coming of  Jesus Christ
and the lowest possible rating of 0 for  the anti-Christ. Nevertheless
they have gone to the trouble of doing their civic duty
by showing  up to vote and express their clear preference for A over B.
(If the method were Approval, there prefernce
for A could not be inferred from their ballots because they would not
have approved either candidate.)

I reply:

Again, that's their business, and their choice. If they don't consider A & B 
worthy of a vote, then I applalud them for not voting for either. Just as I 
woulnd't vote for Kerry or Bush even if they were the only candidates in the 
election, whatever the method.

You continued:

The B supporter doesn't share their religion, and is either  a
strategist or is in love with B, it doesn't matter which.
The A supporters did their duty and reported their sincere ratings of
the candidates. It is complete nonsense to infer
that they have somehow volunteered to be over-ridden by the minority B
supporter, and so therfore majority rule doesn't
matter.

I reply:

If someone has mentioned to them the strategy of CR, then it's complete 
nonsense to say that thery haven't chosen to give up strategic power in 
order to vote sincerely. That's their right. Sometimes I too would vote 
sincerely in CR, when it is contrary to best strategy.

If you're saying that Condorcet would be preferable, I agree. I too prefer 
Condorcet.  But saying that you prefer Condorcet doesn't mean that CR 
wouldn't be a tremendous improvement over Pluralitiy or IRV.

Mike Ossipoff

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