[EM] my 2¢ on range voting (and other pseudomajority methods)
James Green-Armytage
jarmyta at antioch-college.edu
Tue Jan 4 23:09:56 PST 2005
Range voting is neither a majority rule method, a supermajority rule
method, nor a proportional representation method. Therefore, its
applications are very limited.
Let's say that our voting scenario is a large group of people choosing an
executive (e.g. a mayor or president), and there is enough at stake that
people cannot be relied upon to vote sincerely.
I don't think that range voting should be used for this scenario. Why not?
Because it is not a majority rule system. It is possible for a candidate
to win in range voting even if they are the last choice of 99% of the
voters. Unlikely, but mathematically true.
In contentious executive elections, I think that we should stick to
majority rule methods. What is my operational definition of majority rule?
The winner should be a member of the minimal dominant set (aka GeTChA or
Smith). A weaker definition would be the mutual majority criterion. Range
voting passes neither of these criteria, and so I say it has no claim on
being a majority rule method.
Is it somehow better than majority rule? In some non-contentious election
scenarios, perhaps it can be. But in a contentious election, it is not. If
a Condorcet winner is not elected, it does not necessarily mean that
another candidate had a higher utility. More likely, it means that
supporters of the other candidate pulled off a successful strategy. The
interpersonal utility comparison aspect of range voting is just too easy
to hijack for strategic purposes, so that it essentially becomes
meaningless in a contentious election.
If one is concerned about the tyranny of the majority, range voting is not
the answer, because a well-coordinated majority can still guarantee
victory for their candidate of choice. If one is concerned about the
tyranny of the majority, one should look at supermajority methods and
proportional representation methods, rather than at pseudomajority methods
like range voting, approval voting, and Borda.
Sincerely,
James Green-Armytage
http://fc.antioch.edu/~jarmyta@antioch-college.edu/voting.htm
http://fc.antioch.edu/~james_green-armytage/voting.htm
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