[EM] Did Mr May bungle 2 candidate SNTV election maths to hide the fact of 5 papers?

[Craig Carey]

| Subject: [EM] Chris, Range-Voting
| From Markus Schulze markus.schulze at alumni.tu-berlin.de
| Sat Jan 1 16:08:58 PST 2005
|
|     * Previous message: [EM] Chris, Range-Voting
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|
| Hallo,

That is an incorrect spelling of "hello".

|
| Chris Benham wrote (1 Jan 2005):
| > To me, it is axiomatic that a single-winner voting method
| > should, with sincere voting, reduce to FPP when there are
| > only two candidates.
|
| Mike Ossipoff replied (1 Jan 2005):
| > Axiomatic? You're giving to us a fundamental standard that
| > you have. That's your axiom. You mustn't expect everyone
| > to have the same axioms that you have.
|
| That's not Benham's criterion. That's May's criterion:
| If there are only two candidates A and B and the number
| of voters who strictly prefer candidate A to candidate B
| is strictly larger than the number of voters who strictly
| prefer candidate B to candidate A, then candidate A must
| be elected with certainty.
|

That is what I would call:

       a deliberately bungled definition.

We are missing out on the precise reasoning on why Mr Schulze
has perfect in producing worthless definitions.

I expect that Mr May did not deliberately bungle his
solution to the 2 candidate election problem.

I won't show the terror that Mr Schulze has, for listing
the five categories. Here they are, and wach correspinds to
one ballot paper (whatever the count of them):

z0   ()
a0   (A)   
ab   (AB)
b0   (B)
ba   (BA)


The problem with Mr Schulze's  text is that same problem
that Mr Schulze has been getting advice on for over a year:
and it is that the International English language words
"strictly prefers" allows everyone to know that Mr Schulze
is withholding information on which of these 2 summing
methods, he means. Here they are:

OPTION 1:  A wins if (b0+ba) < (a0+ab), etc.
OPTION 2:  A wins if (b0 + ba/2) < (a0 + ab/2).

Billions of other alternative ways to solve the 2 candidate
election exist. If we bump Mr Schulze aside and do the
heavy work of debugging his wording, it would seem that we
can't do better than have a method parameterize by a single
real number. I.e. this method:

OPTION 3: A wins if (b0 + t*ba) < (a0 + t*ab)

I guess that Mr May is not stupid enough to use the
words "strictly prefer" when intending to describe 5
weighting numbers.

Also, since Mr Schulze is content to bungle his
definition of the solution to the 2 candidate election
problem,  I suppose that we should assume that Mr Schulze
can't provide mathematical reasoning that would simply
deduce the solution to the 2 candidate 1 winner election
problem.

Maybe MR MIKE OSSIPOFF can tell us if he would always
prefer a coverup for the number of categories and their
weights. How to match (a) and (b), with (1) and (2):

(a) keeping the categories and their weights, secret
(b) not keeping the weighting numbers secret;
(1) incompetent at designing methods
(2) competent at designing methods.

Mr Schulze's wording is consistent with there being
MORE THAN FIVE CATEGORIES.

Suppose the aim was to hide the fact that Condorcet
variants are all failed by Monotonicity.

There is this scenario with 7 categories. Again I
 remind that Mr Schulze describes these categories and
their weighting numbers (over years) using the words
"strictly prefer"

(A...B...)
(B...A...)
(...A...B...)
(...B...A...)
(...A...)
(...B...)
(...)

Suppose that five of the seven M. Schulze weighting numbers
were zero, and the weights for

   (A...B...)
   (B...A...)

were not zero. That is able to provide a First Past the
Post solution. So despite how I keep saying that Mr Schulze
is aiming to reliably keep secret 5 weighting numbers, it
could be as much as seven weighting numbers.

It seems that Mr Schulze never slips up by describing the
first stage of Condorcet variants. Of course they made to
be unacceptable crap by the design of their first stage.

Mr May simply solved the 2 candidate election problem. He
was not in agreement with the keepers of the secret.

To summarize:
 (1) Mr Schulze deliberately trashed his definition of the
    solution of the 2 candidate election
 (2)  Mr May is not really tied in.
 (3) It is almost as if Mr Schulze got it right for the case
    when some papers have negative counts.
 (4) I assume Mr Shulze would like to present himself as
    lacking ideas on how to solve 0 winner elections.

Mr Benham said that the method should be First Past the
Post when there are 2 candidates.
Mr Schulze's described a method, and it is parameterized
or even less well defined, thus it can't be Mr Benham's
First Past the Post.

There can be more than one lunar cycle between incidents
when Mr Schulze conceals the nature of the first stage that
processes STV papers and their counts.

Mr Schulze seems to be keep the 5 (to 7) weighting numbers
secret, and hidden from us (as the Moon waxes and wanes and
Mr Schulze does not detect the error of making 2 English
words do summing for him,

I try to think of a visual image. It could be this:
a Chicago slaughterhouse: the first step is a step that
Mr Schulze does not want to describe.

Mr Schulze was keeping secret the first stage of Condorcet
method. This 2 candidate is actually First Past  the Post.
But possibly since it is also a Condorcet method, Mr Shulze
withheld the definition of the solution of the 2 candidate
election problem.

Here is the solution:

 The papers are a0*(A) + ab*(AB) + b0*(B) + ba*(BA) + z0*()
 Candidate A wins when b0+ba < a0+ab
 Candidate B wins when a0+ab < b0+ba

I recall that Ms Janet R. Anderson was a teacher. If of English
than a possible plan here is to get English teachers to tell
Mr Schulze that we have figured out that his words "strictly
prefer[s]" and "over" do not precisely define all the summing
numbers. The problem seems to be with us for endless year,
yet I imagine that an intelligent person can figure it out
in seconds:
 (1) the weights and numbers are written down and seem to be
     completely undesirable and best discarded.
 (2) The main need is to get the methdo past Monotonicity.
 (3) Objective (2) is guaranteed to fail if Mr Schulze uses
     his 5 weighting numbers
 (4) So a group of them aim to keep the number of weighting
     numbers all secret. Let's guess: the purpose is founded in
     personal desire (wrong desire).
 (5) As each month passes the problem hangs around which Mr
     Schulze explaining that he does not understand my
     questions.

It seems that Mr May would not mix with the group that want to
keep secret the fact that 2 candidate elections have FIVE
kinds of ballot papers.



---                                                        Craig Carey