[EM] Meaning of preference, four approaches

[Paul Kislanko]

Mike wrote, quoting where necessary:
> 
> Markus doesn´t like the mention of preference in a criterion, 
> and implies 
> that it´s somehow necessarily imprecise. I don´t agree. 

If a term is used in a universally applicable criterion, it must be defined,
or be dependent upon a pre-defined axion (a truth accepted without proof,
and acknowledged within the system). Below you state that you are not a
logician - this is clear, because you state here that a definition with an
undefined term is not impreceise, and below you give an imprecise definition
to the term.

> Here 
> are a few 
> approaches to the meaning of preference:
> 
> 1. No definition needed. Some criteria definitions, and their 
> supporting 
> definitions for some terms in the criteria definitions, have 
> statements that 
> are conditional upon some voters preferring one candidate to 
> another. Then, 
> in an example or scenario that I write to show compliance or 
> noncompliance 
> with the criterion, I specify the preferences of some voters. For the 
> purpose of the criterion, what matters if a certain 
> preference exists, but 
> it doesn´t matter what "prefer" actually means. So, no 
> definition is needed.

But if "prefer" means something different in each of those sentences, what
you just wrote is jibberish. If what you meant had a point to it, then
"prefer" and "preference" must have been used the same way in each sentence.
There's no way to know if "prefer" is an undefined term. 
> 
> 1a. Further, one approach would be to say that not only does 
> it not matter 
> what preference means, but it doesn´t even matter if it means 
> anything. 
> After all, it´s undestood that the writer of a voting 
> situation example or 
> scenario intended to demonstrate something can specify 
> anything he wants to 
> about the example, and whatever he says is taken as true in 
> that example or 
> scenario. An utterance that uses a meaningless word  is a meaningless 
> utterence, and meaningless utterances aren´t statements, and 
> aren´t true or 
> false, but it could be argued that, since it´s understood 
> that what the 
> example-writer says about the voters, votes and candidates in 
> the example is 
> assumed true, then, if that requires that the utterance mean 
> something, then 
>   that assumption that the utterance is a true statrement 
> automatically 
> contains the assumption that the utterance is a statement and means 
> something, even if that assumption is known to be false.

Well, yes, the writer of a scenario can proove anythng she wants when the
terms in the scenario either have no meaning or a different meaning in
diferent parts of the scenario.

> 
> So, by that approach, I could just as well speak in the 
> criteria about 
> whether a majority of the voters [**:_?'] candidate X to 
> candidate Y, as 
> long as I specify in the example that those voters [**;:_?'] X to Y.

Just put where the [**;:_?'] are what YOU MEAN by [**;:_?'] - within the
context of a given election method that might be "ranks X higher than Y"
(which is unambiguous) or "Approves X but not Y" if ranked ballots aren't
involved.
> 
> No, I´m not a logician, so let me know if that isn´t so.
> 
> 1b. But "prefer"  does mean something. However imprecise that 
> meaning is, 
> and even if it were agreed by all that its meaning is 
> unknown, it still 
> means something. 

And all we want to know is what.

> For that reason, that word´s use in an 
> utterance doesn´t 
> make it a meaningless utterance. The utterance means 
> something, even if it 
> isn´t known what it means. 

But it does mean the utterance is either indecipherable or ambiguous. 

> That means that the utterance can 
> be a true or 
> false statement, and we can assume it to be true in the 
> example (because the 
> example-writer says so), without my having to argue that you 
> should also 
> falsely assume it to mean something and be a statement. One 
> fewer assumption 
> needed.

No, when an ambiguous term is used in the utterance, the statement can be
both true AND false. 

> 
> 2. Define it. That way we avoid 1b´s reference to a fact in 
> the world off 
> the paper, the fact that the verb "prefer" is used all the 
> time and means 
> something. By defining "preference", we avoid that, while 
> also avoiding the 
> need for my arguing that you should just assume that "prefer" means 
> something, as in 1a.

Define it within context, or avoid the use of an undefined term.
> 
> A definition of "prefer":
> 
> In general, a person prefes X to Y if, given the choice 
> between X and Y s/he 
> would choose X instead of Y.
> 
> In particular, a voter prefers candidate X to candidate Y, 
> for a particular 
> office, if, given the power to appoint X or Y to the office, 
> s/he would 
> appoint X.
> 
> And a voter prefers proposal X to  proposal Y if, given the choice of 
> enacting or implementing X or Y, s/he would enact or 
> implement X instead of 
> Y.
> 
> [end of general and particular definitiions of "prefer"]

This is the problem - your definitions are about personal choices, and
cannot be applied in any way to the EXPRESSION of a preference. I prefer
chocolate to vanilla in the sense of definition 2. But that isn't relevant
in a vote that asks me to rank Baskin Robbins' 31 flavors of ice cream.

Just say in the example that "a voter prefers X over Y if the voter ranks X
higher than Y" or just use "voter ranks X higher than Y" instead of "prefers
X to Y". (Or, where ranked ballots aren't a part of the example "approves X
but not Y", "chooses X and no other", etc.)

The problem comes in because in discussion about strategies we get into
"sincerely prefers' which in transcendant with regard to methods. With
regard to analysis of the METHODs, the important abstraction is how
individual preferences are EXPRESSED in the method (X is ranked higher than
Y, X=1 Y=0, etc.) then how the mthod can be manipulated by different choices
of X and Y.

In any case, the writer of criteria should avoid undefined terms or define
them.