[EM] optimal Condorcet truncation

[Kevin Venzke]

Russ,

 --- Russ Paielli <6049awj02 at sneakemail.com> a écrit : 
> Russ Paielli 6049awj02-at-sneakemail.com |EMlist| wrote:
> 
> > A more useful criterion is the normal (as opposed to Mike-style) 
> > criterion taken from Blake Cretney's website:
> > 
> > Name: Secret Preferences Criterion: SPC
> > Application: Ranked ballots
> > Definition:
> > If alternative X wins, and some of the ballots are modified in their 
> > rankings below X, X must still win.

> > Condorcet does not pass this criterion, which tells us that voters have 
> > incentive to truncate in some cases if not routinely.

It also tells us that voters have incentive to list additional preferences
in some cases if not routinely.

> The difference is that, in 
> Condorcet, the voter ranks the approved candidates, and the unapproved 
> candidates are not ranked at all.
> 
> By following that rule, the voter eliminates the chance that he will 
> help a candidate below his threshold defeat one above his threshold.

I doubt this is right. I would guess that the reverse is more true:
Tie all your approved candidates in first place, so that they don't
beat each other, and rank all the disapproved candidates, to try to
strengthen their wins over each other.

Kevin Venzke



	

	
		
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