[EM] Comparative Effectiveness of Approval and Condorcet in the case of a three candidate cycle.

[Russ Paielli]

Forest Simmons simmonfo-at-up.edu |EMlist| wrote:
> Russ brought up the issue of effectiveness of Approval.
> 
> I think that we are mostly in agreement now that Approval locks on to 
> the CW fairly quickly when there is a CW.  "Quickly" can even mean 
> during the first election if DSV is used, or if partial results are made 
> available to the voters before most of them cast their approval ballots.

Yes, Approval does have some nice properties under the ideal conditions 
of DSV, but let me play "devil's advocate" again and bring up some 
"real-world" concerns.

I've already brought up the issue of inaccurate polling data, and I 
think the effect of such uncertainty needs to be addressed before the 
effectiveness of Approval can really be evaluated. Someone somewhere has 
probably addressed this issue, but I am personally unaware of it.

Beyond that, has anyone considered the optimal "strategy" in responding 
to a pre-election Approval poll? Since Approval strategy is so dependent 
on polls, this could be a significant issue. Obviously, people are free 
to lie to pollsters. Some may consider that unethical, but many will 
have no such qualms.

So what is the optimal strategy in responding to an Approval poll? Do 
any or all voters have an incentive to lie about their cutoff point -- 
or perhaps to even rearrange their preference order before drawing the 
line? And how would such strategy affect convergence if everyone adopted 
it? Will honest respondents be at a disadvantage?

Obviously that question is a lot easier to ask than it is to answer, but 
I think some sort of answer in necessary before Approval can be fully 
evaluated.

--Russ