[EM] Re: simulating an Approval campaign/election

[Rob LeGrand]

Forest wrote:
> Actually, DSV with Strategy A can sometimes converge to a stable
> equilibrium even when there is no Condorcet Winner:
>
> 4900 C
> 2400 B
> 2700 A>B

You're right.  I forgot to disclose my assumption of strict
preferences.  A better way to say what I meant:  When for every
candidate X there is another candidate Y that is strictly preferred
by a majority of voters to candidate X, there is no equilibrium
under Approval when every voter uses strategy A.  Also, I forgot to
mention that the results of my example election under the different
DSV modes assume that all voters use strategy A.

> [In my opinion this is unfortunate, since it would be better to
> have B and C win with about equal probability in this example.]

Why, do you think?  Candidate A can't win under Approval no matter
what (unless some voters are completely irrational), so the A-first
voters have strong motivation to approve B.  Plus, a majority
strictly prefers B to C.

=====
Rob LeGrand, psephologist
rob at approvalvoting.org
Citizens for Approval Voting
http://www.approvalvoting.org/


	
		
__________________________________ 
Do you Yahoo!? 
Yahoo! Mail - You care about security. So do we. 
http://promotions.yahoo.com/new_mail