[EM] Updated article

rob brown rob at karmatics.com
Sat Dec 24 16:02:27 PST 2005


Thanks for your feedback Jan, comments below....

On 12/23/05, Jan Kok <jan.kok.5y at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Rob,
>
> Overall, I like the previous, short version and the current version
> about equally.  The short version spent a larger fraction of the text
> talking about the problems with Plurality voting.  The problems with
> Plurality are the common ground that pretty much all voting reformers
> (IRVists, Approvalists, Condorcetists...) agree on.  Those problems
> are also the most likely "hook" to get ordinary citizens and political
> activists interested in voting reform.  So, I like to put a lot of
> emphasis on the problems with Plurality when I promote voting reform.


I tend to agree.  I think people very quickly lose interest in voting reform
when they see that those who advocate reform are so factionalized
themselves.

At least I pointed out that (in my opinion) DSV-approval and the various
Condorcet methods are pretty much equal.  I see no reason to dwell on their
various imperfections in documents intended for the masses.  I continue to
have the opinion that the "cycle resolution" imperfections of Condorcet and
DSV methods are academic and would have few real world consequences if we
just agreed on one method or another.  In other words, here is my vote:

[X] DSV- Approval Strategy A
[X] Condorcet- Shultz
[X] Condorcet - Ranked Pairs
[X] Condorcet - Minmax
[X] Condorcet - R Brown scoring algorithm
[ ] IRV
[ ] Approval
[ ] Range
[ ] Plurality
[ ] Dictatorship

(and yes I am aware of the irony of unapproving Approval....) :)

It's a pity that Approval isn't your favorite method.  If it was, you
> could keep the article pretty short. :-)
>
> You say "If the voter guesses wrong, there is a good chance that
> voting may actually do more harm than good to his own cause."  I am
> afraid the casual reader won't understand what you are talking about,
> unless you reword this to be more descriptive, or show an example.


Good suggestion.  See my update.  http://karmatics.com/voting/movienite.html
The permanent url of this revision is
http://karmatics.com/voting/movienite-r3.html (with r1 and r2 being the
older ones).  New stuff is in green, ommitted stuff in red.

I think this explains the problem pretty clearly.

I don't see any way to avoid explaining the problem clearly, because
> that problem is the justification for allowing voters to cahnge their
> votes, and for introducing ranked ballot methods.  I assume you are
> talking about the problem that if a voter underestimates the strength
> of his Favorite candidate (relative to a Disliked candidate who seems
> to have a chance of winning) and votes for a Compromise candidate in
> addition to his Favorite (in order to keep Disliked from winning),
> Compromise may win, whereas Favorite might have won if there were not
> so many votes for Compromise.
>
> By the way, allowing people to change their votes in Approval voting
> serves the same function as pre-election polls.  If we had Approval
> Voting as our public election method, I expect that candidates,
> parties, special interest groups and the media would all want to have
> polls that would accurately estimate the results of the election.


Here is the problem with that as I see it:  it works ok for, say,
presidential elections.  Last time I voted, though, there were a ton
different seperate elections on the ballot, mayor, district supervisor,
sherrif, etc.  I had no idea of who was likely to win....its hard enough to
just learn about all the candidates, much more so if I have to keep track of
who is ahead in the polls.

Furthermore, this doesn't work in other types of elections like the movie
example I used.  From a practical point of view, this means that we can't
get people used to our "better" election method through things like web
polls, or in voting for the officers of small organizations, etc.  By having
the expectation that people will have accurate polling info served to them,
you have limited the usefulness of the method.  I find that extremely
unfortunate, and unnecessary as well.  The DSV method I proposed seems to
have all the advantages of Approval, without the "need to know polling info
and strategy" downside. (of course, I think Condorcet methods do as well,
but with DSV Approval, it is easier to demonstrate that it is so because of
the way it is derived from Approval)

-rob
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