[EM] Approval Voting elections don't always have an equilibrium

[Rob LeGrand]

Jan wrote:
> So, it seems an Approval election can have NO equilibrium, and
> obviously there will often be ONE equilibrium.  Question: can
> there be more than one equilibrium?

Yes, but I believe it requires sincere tied preferences.  Given
the sincere rankings

49:A>B=C
21:B>C>A
30:C>B>A

there are two approval DSV strategy-A equilibria (which also
turn out to be strong Nash equilibria):

49:A
21:B
30:CB

49:A
21:BC
30:C

--
Rob LeGrand, psephologist
rob at approvalvoting.org
Citizens for Approval Voting
http://www.approvalvoting.org/


		
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