[EM] Alright, next try. Range voting fix, version 2.

[Scott Ritchie]

On Thu, 2005-12-08 at 17:10 -0800, rob brown wrote:
> I am going to guess a few things:
> 
> 1) that it will be extremely rare that it does not find a Nash
> equilibrium in fewer than 20 rounds

Here's an example where it will never resolve:

Voter 1:
A: 100
B: 40
C: 0

Voter 2:
A: 45
B: 0
C: 100

Voter 3:
A: 0
B: 100
C: 60

A simple Condorcet cycle.

Let's say it starts at 50 as the approval margin.  The total is then:
A: 1
B: 1
C: 2

So, C will win, but Voter 3 can get a better option with a lower margin.
So we then downrate his vote...similarly voter 1 can get a better option
by lowering his margin, so in the next round of tabulating we get:
A: 2
B: 2
C: 1

This one won't resolve.  Ever.

> 2) that the results of this will be remarkably similar to the results
> obtained by some of the better Condorcet methods 

Might want to make sure it's deterministic first.

Thanks,
Scott Ritchie