[EM] two "new" hybrid approval-ranking methods by Brams & Sanver

[Dgamble997 at aol.com]

Hello list
 
I haven't been paying much attention to this list lately.  I recently  
received a private e-mail from Chris Benham suggesting that I should look at the  
following paper by Brahms and Sanver
 
_http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/faculty/brams/approval_preference.pdf_ 
(http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/faculty/brams/approval_preference.pdf) 
 
I was surprised to find that the PAV (preference approval voting) method  
described is identical to something called Ranked Approval that I posted to this  
list 18 months ago.
 
_http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2004-Ju
ne/013322.html_ 
(http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2004-June/013322.html) 
 
I went off this method because of its vulnerability to strategic voting and  
later no harm failures.
 
Take the following example under Ranked Approval/preference approval  voting:
 
41: A
44: B>A
5: C>B
10: C
 
A is the only candidate approved by a majority of voters and therefore the  
winner.
 
If the 44 B>A voters approve only B the votes are now:
 
 
41: A
44: B
5: C>B
10: C

 
and B is the winner as the most approved candidate.
 
David Gamble
 
 
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