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<DIV>Hello list</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>I haven't been paying much attention to this list lately. I recently
received a private e-mail from Chris Benham suggesting that I should look at the
following paper by Brahms and Sanver</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV><A
href="http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/faculty/brams/approval_preference.pdf">http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/faculty/brams/approval_preference.pdf</A></DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>I was surprised to find that the PAV (preference approval voting) method
described is identical to something called Ranked Approval that I posted to this
list 18 months ago.</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV><A
href="http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2004-June/013322.html">http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2004-June/013322.html</A></DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>I went off this method because of its vulnerability to strategic voting and
later no harm failures.</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>Take the following example under Ranked Approval/preference approval
voting:</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>41: A</DIV>
<DIV>44: B>A</DIV>
<DIV>5: C>B</DIV>
<DIV>10: C</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>A is the only candidate approved by a majority of voters and therefore the
winner.</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>If the 44 B>A voters approve only B the votes are now:</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>
<DIV>41: A</DIV>
<DIV>44: B</DIV>
<DIV>5: C>B</DIV>
<DIV>10: C</DIV></DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>and B is the winner as the most approved candidate.</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<DIV>David Gamble</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
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