[EM] Re: reason #17

[Araucaria Araucana]

On 29 Aug 2005 at 16:06 UTC-0700, Forest Simmons wrote:
> More discussion on this is found in the thread which contains the
> following seminal message:
>  
> http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2005-March/015316.html
>  
> explaining how DMC, AWP, and "Approval Margins" (AM) are related to
> each other, and how they fit into the family of Condorcet methods, and
> also comparing their effectiveness against burying.
>  
> Here's when I first saw the light that DMC was the best Condorcet
> proposal:
>  
> http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2005-March/015418.html
>  

Forest is too modest.  DMC/RAV finds the same winner as a method he
proposed earlier.  At one time, he called it, variously, Approval
Sorted Condorcet, Approval Seeded Bubble Sort, or Bubble Sorted
Approval.  Lately I've taken to calling it Pairwise Sorted Approval.
It was first proposed in March 2001:

http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2001-March/005448.html

The main difference (advantage?) of the DMC/RAV formulation is that it
finds the winner directly.  But the social ordering that results from
determining the DMC winner, removing that winner, finding the DMC
runner up, etc. is exactly the pairwise-sorted approval ordering.

Q        
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