[EM] IRV vs BC
BARNES99 at vaxa.cis.uwosh.edu
Sun Mar 11 13:26:14 PST 2001
It seems to me that there is a glaring weakness in arguments that the
Borda Count (BC) is inferior, overall, to the Instant Runoff Vote
(IRV) because it is more manipulatable, even if it is more
First of all, it is worth noting that it has been mathematically
proven that all voting procedure necessarily must be manipulatable
(M. Satterthwaite, "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions,"
_Journal of Economic Theory_, 1975, 10: 187-217). Therefore, since
manipulatability is only a matter of degree, the most you can claim
is that the BC is more manipulatable than, for example, the IRV.
Anyway, lets take it for granted that the BC is relatively vulnerable
to successful manipulation by strategic or insincere voting, in
comparison to the IRV; that is to say, that the BC can elect someone
other than the voters' truly most preferred candidate, to the benefit
of voters who strategically submit dishonest or insincere votes.
Well, what about the argument that the BC has been mathematically
proven (see Donald Saari, "Mathematical Structure of Voting
Paradoxes," _Journal of Economic Theory_, January 2000, pgs 1-102; or
Donald Saari, "The Symmetry and Complexity of Elections,"
<http-//www.math.nwu.edu/~d_saari/vote/expos.pdf>) to be the ONLY
method which can be guaranteed to always accurately reflect the
voters' preferences when they vote honestly and sincerely? That is,
what about Saari's mathematical proof that the BC is the only method
which always gives an accurate accounting of THE VOTES THEMSELVES,
regardless of whether those votes are honest and sincere or not?
Shouldn't that count for something? (For the sake of argument, let's
take Saari's analysis for granted, and assume that it is true that
the BC is indeed the best method for determining the most preferred
candidate from SINCERE votes.) Given the soundness of Saari's
analysis, couldn't the accuracy of the BC outweigh its
manipulatability, in comparison to the IRV?
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