[EM] question/comments re DMC

Jobst Heitzig heitzig-j at web.de
Tue Aug 30 02:29:54 PDT 2005


Dear Warren!

You wrote:
> but in range's case it is particularly self-evident.

Right, I could have seen that myself, sorry.

> --Also, now that I understand DMC has two kinds of monotonicity property, I 
> must report my admiration.   

Why? Many Approval/Condorcet-hybrids are monotonic in both senses.
 
> DMC however exhibits "no show paradoxes" where
> voting for A top cuases A to lose, and if you had instead not voted, A would
> win.     This is something like a monotonicity failure (although technically not
> one).     Range voting in contrast is both monotonic and never exhibits
> a no-show paradox, so in that sense range voting is superior.

Agreed. Most Condorcet methods violate mono-add-top as they violate later-no-harm. But at least adding a truncated ballot with a first preference only is monotonic.


Yours, Jobst

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