[EM] question/comments re DMC

Warren Smith wds at math.temple.edu
Mon Aug 29 15:37:11 PDT 2005


>>6. Robustness against "noise" candidates.. cloneproof...
> --also true of range.

Could you say more precisely what you mean here?


--Range voting is immune to clones in the sense that any number of cloned
candidates, all of whom get the same rangevote scores, can be added to the scene,
and the election winner will remain unchanged (except perhaps for replacement by a clone).

Also, if "noise" candidates are added who have no hope of winning, then the range votes
with noise scores being adjoined  for the new candidates, will still yield the same winner
and indeed the same totals.

Many other voting schemes have these properties (and many also do not
have these properties) but in range's case it is particularly self-evident.


--Also, now that I understand DMC has two kinds of monotonicity property, I 
must report my admiration.   

DMC however exhibits "no show paradoxes" where
voting for A top cuases A to lose, and if you had instead not voted, A would
win.     This is something like a monotonicity failure (although technically not
one).     Range voting in contrast is both monotonic and never exhibits
a no-show paradox, so in that sense range voting is superior.

wds



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