[EM] RE: Approval strategy in close three-way race?

[Simmons, Forest]

The approval strategy that maximizes voting power (thus minimizing the probability of an approval voter's regret) in a close three way race is this:
 
First decide your preference order among the three major candidates, say A>B>C.
 
Of course you should approve A and leave C unapproved.  Approve B only if B has a greater chance of being tied for most approval with C than with A.
 
If there is no reliable way of knowing which of these two ties for most approval is more likely, then approve B only if you consider B to be closer to A than to C in value.
 
For strategical purposes it doesn't matter which (if any) non-contenders that you approve, so just approve the ones that you would like to encourage.
 
Unsophisticated voters might have to rely on the advice of their favorite candidate or some other trusted advisor when they don't have a strong feeling for approval and disapproval.


Rob Lanphier had written ...


Let's take a look at the landscape of the U.S. Presidential race.  There
was a time (June, 1992) where it was virtually a three-way tie.
According to Gallup, Ross Perot lead the race for president, favored by
34% of Americans, compared to 32% for Bush and 24% for Clinton.  These
numbers shifted around significantly during that time, such that it was
really hard to tell which of the three was a "front-runner".  Had the
election been held right then and there, picking out just two
front-runners would have been difficult.

So, what's the right strategy in Approval?

Rob



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End of Election-methods Digest, Vol 14, Issue 27
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