[EM] Center for Range Voting Formed

Warren Smith wds at math.temple.edu
Thu Aug 11 17:33:49 PDT 2005


>As someone who has a rather bad habit of calling simple and honest
mistakes "lying", I can sympathize with your reaction.  Either way,
though, range voting isn't Condorcet compliant, as Condorcet is defined
by the concept of pairwise victories, which do simplify to the mere
greater than or less than considerations you're trying to avoid with
range voting.

Teehee,
Scott Ritchie

--no, you don't get it.

The question is, what IS a "pairwise victory" of A over B?

If it means (1) "if we redid the same election using the same election system
and the same votes (but with all candidates erased except A&B) then A would win"
then:
  Range voting is a condorcet method.

If it means (2a) "if we redid the same election but using a DIFFERENT election system,
namely majority vote, and demanding votes `logically consistent' with
the originally-cast votes, then A would win" or (equivalently in the case of RV) if it means
(2b) "if we redid the same election using the same election system,
BUT voters now get to CHANGE their votes to make them maximally strategic
under the assumption their original votes were honest, then A would win"
then range is not a condorcet method.


ASIDE:
And there is a further additional subtlety which unfortunately I have never seen
discussed in any book on voting, but which is very important.
(It *is* discussed in *my* book on voting, 80% written, and
hopefully it wil be published...).  That is, what if it means
(3) "if we redid the same election using the same election system,
BUT voters now get to CHANGE their votes to make them maximally strategic
under the assumption their original votes were strategic, then A would win"  ?

So there are 3 different possible definitions of "condorcet method."  They
are not at all equivalent.

And the strategic vs honest distinction in 1 vs 3 in fact can be applied
to practically every "property" you EM people ever discuss.
If you consider that, I think you will find that under this change,
a heck of a lot of methods that you guys say obey some property P, in
fact with strategic voters will NOT obey P, or vice versa.  This
distinction makes a big difference and it is quite ludicrous to 
shove it under the rug and pretend it does not exist, like most
authors have done.
END OF ASIDE.

So teehee back at you.

-wds



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