[EM] Center for Range Voting Formed

[Warren Smith]

> Well, according to that definition, Range Voting is a Condorcet
> method, since if you erase all candidates and all numerical votes for
> them in all range votes - except for two candidates A and B - then A
> will beat B in the resulting 2-choice election if and only if he beat
> B in the original election. Because erasing the votes for the others
> has no effect on A and B's individual totals.

Here's a counterexample:

41 ballots:
A:10
B:3
C:0
(Ranked equiv: A>B>C)

10 ballots:
A:5
B:10
C:0
(Ranked equiv: B>A>C)

10 ballots:
A:0
B:10
C:5
(Ranked equiv: B>C>A)

39 ballots:
A:0
B:3
C:10
(Ranked equiv: C>B>A)

Range Voting result:
A:460
B:440
C:440

Condorcet winner: B
B beats A: 59-41
B beats C: 61-39
A beats C: 61-39

Running the "erase the candidate" filter over this election doesn't
change the fact that A beats B in a Range election, even though B is the
Condorcet winner by a clear margin.

Rob

--
no, as I said in the file you were criticizing, I was defining a beats-all winner
to be one who, ACCORDING TO HIS RANGE VOTING TOTALS, beat all others.

In the first defn.

So your "B is the condorcet winner" does not imply "B is the beats all winner"
according to WEIGHTED votes.   

My point was Condorcet only considered <,>,= relations WITHOUT numerical magnitudes,
just yes of no, as votes, hence the distinction between my 1st + 2nd
defintions of the Condorcet concept, dd not occur in his mind.

Anyhow I am soon goign to rewrite this section thanks
to your criticisms + my own self-criticims