[EM] majorities and ordinal-only pairwise methods

[James Green-Armytage]

James replying to Jobst...

Jobst:
>
>Then I'm sorry to have misrepresented what your main point is.

	No problem. Of course, you weren't too far off; strategy resistance is a
big part of my concern. I said:
>> 	My main purpose in using cardinal information is to incorporate
>> preference strength into defeat strength, and thus to protect defeats
>that
>> consist of many strong preferences. 

	By this, I mean that they should not only be protected under sincere
conditions, but that they should also be protected against strategic
incursion by those who disagree with the defeat.

James:
>
>> 	Oh, wonderful! Are you fully aware of my "approval-weighted pairwise"
>> method (AWP)? AWP is basically the same thing as CWP, except for the
>fact
>> that only two cardinal scores can be given: 1 and 0. I suggest that it
>has
>> anti-strategic properties that are comparable to CWP, and that it is
>> significantly more strategy-resistant than DMC/RAV, AM, margins, and WV.
Jobst:
>I know, and that is a great pro for AWP. That's also why I essentially
>proposed something like AWP as "grand compromise" half a year ago. 

	Yes, I remember that, now. October 11, 2004. (I proposed AWP on June 8,
2004.) On September 6, 2004, you also proposed something close to what
I've lately been calling it S/WPO, for "strong/weak preference option".
Apparently something similar was proposed by Steve Eppley back in the "old
days" of the list.

Jobst:
>But
>DFC and DMC are definitely much more simple 

	DMC/RAV has pretty simple rules, I'll give you that. I'm not sure that
DFC (democratic fair choice) is especially simple... Would you mind giving
me a maximally short definition of it? (Sorry if that means that you have
to repeat yourself.)

Jobst:
>without having considerably
>more strategy problems, 

	This has yet to be established, I think.

my best,
James