"Best" candidates, and Social Orderings (was: [EM] Sincere methods)

Steve Eppley seppley at alumni.caltech.edu
Mon Apr 4 13:33:36 PDT 2005


Hi,

Jobst wrote:
-snip-
> So, I suggest not to claim your favourite method finds "the best"
> candidate, as so many of us frequently do. Rather, one should say
> that the favourite method elects a "very good candidate as measured
> by <whatever>" and then explain why those measures are considered
> important! 
-snip-

I think it's crucial to also consider the effect of the voting 
method on whether "best" & "good" candidates will choose to run
rather than risk spoiling the outcome.  Jobst's statement is
not inconsistent with this; I'm just drawing attention to this
since the effect of the voting method on the nomination process 
is sometimes overlooked.

-snip-
> Finally, there is an important criterion by Steve, "immunity from
> 2nd place complaints", which seems to indicate that a social
> ordering was needed. But that criterion only states that when we
> remove the original winner and apply the method *again* after
> striking out that candidate from all ballots, then the new winner
> should not be one who defeats the original one pairwise. This is a
> useful criterion, but it has nothing to do with social orderings,
> at least in my opinion. 
-snip-

It's my related criterion, immunity from majority complaints
(IMC), that demands a social ordering.  

Part of the justification for IMC is that the urge for pundits 
and losers and other interested onlookers to construct a social 
ordering will be irresistable, and therefore the natural ways 
to extend the voting method to produce a social ordering--
for instance, iteratively eliminating the 1st thru k-1th place 
finishers from the ballots and then retallying to find the kth 
finisher--should satisfy some criteria to avoid undermining 
the acceptability of the voting method and the outcomes.  

Another part of the justification for producing social
orderings is that something seems very fishy about a 
voting method that purports to be able to find a winner
but whose principles must not be extended to find the
2nd place finisher, etc.  There are so many examples
of competitions in which more than just the winner
is calculated that failure to do so will, I predict,
induce a lot of discomfort and dissatisfaction.  
Examples with only a winner are rare, and I speculate 
that in those examples the reasons for finding only 
a winner aren't relevant to democratic elections.  
A close example, though, is the selection of a pope, 
with no 2nd place finisher; even the ballots are destroyed.

--Steve




More information about the Election-Methods mailing list