[EM] summary of Condorcet anti-strategy measures

[Chris Benham]

James,
I had written:

> Approval Margins is highly resistant to Burying, and
in my view is not qualitatively worse in this respect
than Approval-Weighted Pairwise. 

And you responded:

> "Could you please support these two assertions?" 

For the time being I'll just say that my observation
is borne out by a lot of examples. In all your
excellent examples given to demonstrate AWP's
resistance to Burying, AM  also frustrates the
Buriers; except in one where AWP "cheated"  by
electing a "strongly defeated" candidate
(pairwise beaten by a candidate with a higher
approval score). 
Here is an example in which they both fail:

49: A>>C>B   (sincere is A>B>>C)
03: B>>A>C
48: C>>B>A

> "Here's the main (minor, but worth noting)
difference I see between Steve's original proposal and
my current understanding of S/WPO... Steve's method
counts > initially as >, and then changes it to = if
there is no CW. Thus, the direction of the pairwise
defeats could change in the second count. My version
of S/WPO, on the other hand, counts > as > when it
comes to the direction of the defeat (whether there is
a CW or not), but counts it as = for the purpose of
finding the strength of the defeats. Thus the initial
defeat directions are preserved. I think that the
latter approach is preferable, in that it has greater
continuity than the first." 

Of course in the 3-candidate situation, your S/WPO
(winning votes) is the same thing as AWP while
S/WPO(Margins) would be the same thing as AM.


Chris Benham



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