[EM] A few compliances & noncompliances of DMC

MIKE OSSIPOFF nkklrp at hotmail.com
Thu Apr 14 19:53:35 PDT 2005


Strictly speaking, DMC meets SDSC. But it meets it in a weaker sense than do 
the single-mode methods SD, SSD, BeatpathWinner/CSSD, MAM, & RP.

For comparing methods that use mixed balloting modes to single-mode methods, 
one could define "thorough" versions of the criteria, in which "vote(s) X 
over Y" is replaced with "thoroughly vote(s) X over Y"

Informally, a voter thoroughly votes X over Y if s/he votes X over with with 
respect to each balloting mode that that the method in use uses to choose 
its winner.

Probably a precise definition could be written. Maybe later, by me, or maybe 
by someone else.

DMC doesn't meet SFC.

DMC, being a pairwise-count method, can benefit from ATLO, to avoid the 
co-operation/defection dilemma that James spoke of.

Somone pointed out to me that James' co-operation/defection dilemma, the 
bad-example of Approval, is not as bad as the co-operation/defection dilemma 
known as the "prisoner's dilemma".

We've been hearing a lot about wv not meeting LNH (Later No Harm). As I've 
many times pointed out on EM, the way that IRV protects your favorite from 
being harmed by votes for your lower choices is, by elimnating your favorite 
before it lets you help anyone else. I call that electoral euthanasia.

But LNH does have one use: It's one way of avoiding James' 
co-operation/defection dilemma. But that problem can also be well dealt-with 
via ATLO, and so there's no justification for giving up what needs to be 
given up in order to get LNH, as a way of avoiding the 
co-operation/defection dilemma.

Mike Ossipoff

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