[EM] realization on method equivalence
Russ Paielli
6049awj02 at sneakemail.com
Tue Apr 12 00:34:59 PDT 2005
Folks,
I just realized that two Condorcet-Approval hybrid methods that I had
thought were distinct are actually equivalent. This may have been
pointed out already, and it may even be obvious to some, but it was a
significant realization to me nonetheless. (If it *has* been pointed
out, please don't hesitate to tell me where.)
Method 1: The winner is the most-approved member of the Smith set.
Method 2: If no CW exists, repeatedly drop the least-approved candidate
until a CW is found.
Here's why I think they are equivalent:
As you drop candidates, you cannot get a CW until only one member of the
Smith set remains. Since the candidates are dropped increasing order of
approval starting with the least-approved, the final remaining member of
the Smith set must be the most-approved member of that set.
"Method 2" is simpler to explain because the Smith set need not be
determined or even defined for uninterested members of the general
public. However, "Method 1" provides the more compelling justification.
Why *wouldn't* you choose the most-approved member of the Smith set?
--Russ
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