[EM] summary of Condorcet anti-strategy measures

[Chris Benham]

James,
I like this suggestion:

> Strong/weak preference option (S/WPO): Voters can
express both strong and weak preferences. The
direction of pairwise defeats are determined by both
strong and weak preferences, and the strength of
pairwise defeats are determined only by strong
preferences. Comments: Slightly more flexible variant
on AERLO/ATLO. 

I  think this was proposed a long time ago by Steve
Eppley.  In principle I like it, because it isn't an
*explicit* strategy device.  It just asks the voters
for more specific preference information, without
inviting the voters to strategize or expecting them to
know or care what a "majority rule cycle" is.
So I  don't think your comment does it justice.

You wrote:

> Dear election methods fans, Here is a brief list of
measures that have been proposed so far with the aim
of curtailing Condorcet's vulnerability to the burying
strategy. I invite all participants to remind me of
other proposals that fit in this category, and to
propose new methods with the same goal. 

Approval Margins is highly resistant to Burying, and
in my view is not qualitatively worse in this respect
than Approval-Weighted Pairwise.

Chris Benham

Find local movie times and trailers on Yahoo! Movies.
http://au.movies.yahoo.com