[EM] Re: IRV-P. Another name for Condorcet?

[Dave Ketchum]

I LIKE IRV-C, though I would emphasize its Condorcet parentage more than 
Rob suggests.

On Fri, 17 Sep 2004 17:35:29 +0000 (UTC) Rob Brown wrote:

> I like IRV-P.  I also would like IRV-C, for Condorcet.  With the latter, 
> the "named after a person" part is played down, but still making a reference 
> to the old name can reduce some confusion, since it has been called Condorcet 
> for so long.


I would go with IRV-C as the popular name, but ask that its Condorcet 
parentage be indicated in any serious documentation.

> 
> To most of the world, Condorcet methods are the same thing as IRV.  You rank 
> the candidates, and it eliminates many of the bad effects of plain old 
> plurality.  In my opinion (and I'm sure many would disagree) the differences 
> between regular IRV and Condorcet are relatively subtle (compared to the 
> difference between plurality and IRV, for instance). From a voter perspective, 
> the two techniques are effectively the same (that is, all the changes are on 
> the back end, and the voters don't really need to know about them if they 
> aren't voting geeks).


Agreed that many voters would not really see the differences, beyond the 
advantage they share over Plurality.  We could do better in our 
describing, for those ready for a bit of detail:
      IRV and IRV-C let voters rank multiple candidates, and the counting 
ignores minor candidates for getting small vote totals.
      Often there are not over two major candidates, and both methods 
always agree as to winner.
      Even with more major candidates, IRV and IRV-C will usually agree as 
to winner (looking back to Florida in 2000, there were about 13 candidates 
- Bush and Gore clearly major - Nader not major, though he might have been 
closer to major with ranked ballots - lesser candidates clearly minor).
      With more major candidates, and approaching a tie:
           IRV, not looking at complete ballots, can have spoiler problems.
            IRV-C calls its problem cycles.  While there must be rules for 
them, they are not especially critical, for they happen only to near ties.

> 
> Calling it IRV-P or IRV-C does this:  many people have heard of IRV, and by 
> presenting Condorcet as a refinement of IRV, rather than an entirely new 
> method, it can tap into the marketing put behind IRV.  I also think the 
> phrase "instant runoff" communicates something to the average person about 
> what it does, that "Condorcet" does not.


I do not buy "refinement" as properly descriptive - they are simply 
closely related, with generally identical voting and, for most elections, 
identical results.  "Instant runoff" is a bit misleading for IRV, and 
should be kept out of sight with IRV-C, which does not even pretend to do 
that.

Extreme example, showing IRV-C not getting confused by what spoils IRV. 
Given:
      A - balancing budget is not critical.
      B - balancing budget IS critical, but details not specified.
      C - agree with B, but method must be cut spending.
      D - agree with B, but method must be increase taxes.
      E - agree with B, but method must be profit from government business.

Possible votes:
     30 A
     25 C,B
     20 D,B
     15 E,B
     10 B

IRV will discard B, E, and D, and see 30 A as a majority over 25 C.
IRV-C will see 70 B as stronger than 30 A.

Summary:  While they are not agreed on details, MOST of these voters want 
the budget balanced - and IRV-C, looking at whole ballots, will see this.
-- 
  davek at clarityconnect.com    people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
  Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
            Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
                  If you want peace, work for justice.