[EM] Re: reccomendations (Schwartz // SC-WMA correction)
Chris Benham
chrisbenham at bigpond.com
Mon Sep 6 22:53:02 PDT 2004
James Green-Armytage wrote:
>Am I correct in observing that Schwartz // SC-WMA is similar to completing
>Condorcet with Schwartz and then Bucklin? How does the former differ from
>the latter?
>
>my best,
>James
>
>
>
>
CB: Bucklin hopelessly fails Clone Independence, and so (according to
EMR) is vulnerable to crowding
<http://condorcet.org/emr/defn.shtml#crowding> and teaming
<http://condorcet.org/emr/defn.shtml#teaming>.
I would never knowingly reccomend a method that does that.
On the other hand Bucklin meets Mono-raise, and SC-WMA (I think
fairly benignly) doesn't.
Here is a simple example from Marcus Schulze:
2: A>B>C
3: B>C>A
4: C>A>B
Bucklin and SC-WMA both elect C.
Now we replace C with the clone set C1, C2, C3.
2: A>B>C2>C1>C3
3: B>C3>C2>C1>A
4: C1>C2>C3>A>B
Now Bucklin elects B.
SC-WMA "Weights": A:2, B:3, C1: 4, C2: 0, C3: 0.
Each ballot approves from the top, until at least half (by "weight") of
the candidates have been approved. Thus:
2:A,B
3:B,C3,C2,C1
4:C1,C2,C3,A
Final "approval" scores: A:6, B:5, C1: 7, C2: 7, C3: 7.
The three clones are tied for first. I would favour resolving this by
electing the tied candidate with the greatest "weight", C1.
Chris Benham
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