[EM] Cycles in sincere individual preferences and application to vote-col...

Adam Tarr atarr at purdue.edu
Mon Sep 6 15:24:47 PDT 2004

> >The reason I wouldn't have chosen E over B, C, or D on a ranked ballot
> >with A as an alternative is that B, C, D "trumped" E on every issue that
> >was not the single one that A&E agreed upon.
>And yet, you already stated you would prefer E pairwise over any of the
>three.  So why, oh why, would you rank E below them?  In what meaningful
>sense do you rank any of those three over E?  Agreeing with them on more
>issues is irrelevant if the one issue you support E on trumps all others.
>I thought I'd explained that. Let me try again.
>Issue 1 makes A>B>C>D and ties A=E, but that's only one issue. Issues two 
>through 10  makes B=C=D>E, so since A covers issue 1 and issues 2-10 and E 
>fails 2-10 and none of B,C,D fail issue 2/3, when A is in the picture 
>A>B>C>D>E. When A is NOT in the picture, my issue 1 puts E over B,C,D. (I 
>guess I'd have to hold my nose, but that wouldn't mean I wasn't sincere or 

Right, I understood all of this, and still believe it to be illogical.  You 
prefer E to B,C,D.  The presence or lack thereof of A is irrelevant.  You 
prefer A to B, A to E, and E to B.  Transitive.  QED.

Now, if this were multi-winner, you could have a point.  Perhaps you're 
more interested in getting a balance of your views represented on the 
council, as long as you get your key view represented by A.  But, if given 
a choice between ONLY E and ONLY B, you pick E.  So there's really no 
reason at all, in single-winner Condorcet, to vote anything but A>E>B>C>D.
> >But once A is out of the picture, there's one issue that E trumps B, C,
> >and D on. And if A&E are both out of the picture than my sincere ordering
> >of B, C, D could well change.
>To which I once again ask, why?  Why does the existence or absence of
>another alternative change how you feel about B relative to C?  Note that
>even within a group, such reversal of preferences is not part of
>Condorcet's paradox.
>See above. I've provided an example where one issue trumps all others 
>because "I" am a radical pro-lifer. As long as there's somebody in the 
>choices that supports that and a lot of other of my issues, the one who 
>supports attack weapons and capital punishment is lowest on my totem pole. 
>But take out the one who supports my position on those three issues, I'll 
>move up the idiot who likes AK-47s and capital punishment JUST because she 
>also supports anti-abortion legisletion.

If you were going to move him up in the situation where A doesn't win, you 
may as well put him up there anyway.  There's no prize for second 
place.  All you're really saying here is that you have the preference 
(A+B)>(A+E).  That's relevant for multi-winner, but not single-winner.

>We need to axiomitize the study and stop saying "any input that is 
>illogical within the context of the method" is not worth worrying about.

I'm not arguing it's illogical merely within the context of the 
method.  I'm arguing that it is illogical, period.

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20040906/f9bb762d/attachment-0003.htm>

More information about the Election-Methods mailing list