[EM] Does MAM use the Copeland method?
Paul Kislanko
kislanko at airmail.net
Wed Oct 6 14:58:43 PDT 2004
I guess y'all are missing my point.
A wins in the example ONLY because the method discards the C>A votes because
of the B>C>A set of ballots.
If we're trying to find something better than plurality, it needs to be
demonstrably better, and of course this example gives exactly the same
results as plurality, which is why examples aren't proofs.
But, to use the terminology and techniques y'all do, let's examine the
BALLOTS that result if B is not a candidate:
4: A>C
5: C>A
Adding B to the mix causes A to be elected, even though all voters who
prefer B over anybody voted A third of the 3.
So I ask again, if A should win, why should I prefer any method over
plurality?
> -----Original Message-----
> From: election-methods-electorama.com-bounces at electorama.com
> [mailto:election-methods-electorama.com-bounces at electorama.com
> ] On Behalf Of Steve Eppley
> Sent: Wednesday, October 06, 2004 4:41 PM
> To: election-methods at electorama.com
> Subject: Re: [EM] Does MAM use the Copeland method?
>
> Hi,
> Adam H wrote:
> > The point of the example was to show the way the method
> performed in
> > an election where each and every person was pairwise beaten
> by one of
> > the others.
>
> I hate to quibble, but I merely wanted a simple example to
> demonstrate how MAM works.
>
> But yes, I basically agree with Adam's response to Paul, and
> want to add that the context we are working in assumes that
> one and only one of the candidates must be elected. (Of
> course, that's a criterion, and Paul doesn't care about any
> criteria, or so he says.)
>
> > A loses to C in 5/9 votes.
> > B loses to A in 6/9 votes.
> > C loses to B in 7/9 votes.
> >
> > Paul Kislanko <kislanko at airmail.net> wrote:
> >> I KNOW most pairwise methods elect A in this example.
> >> But pairwise A loses to C by a majority, so why do the
> methods elect
> >> A?
>
> Assuming one of the candidates must be elected, which one?
> If not A, then Paul either wants to elect B, which loses to A
> by a larger majority, or he wants to elect C, which loses to
> B by a larger majority. Size matters.
>
> By the way, as I pointed out earlier, non-pairwise methods
> also elect A.
>
> >From another message, here's Paul's latest wording of
> his question:
> > 5 of 9 voters voted C>A.
> > Paul's question is how can anyone justify A's win.
>
> Answer: One of the candidates must win; which would be a
> better winner than A? Paul should clarify his point by
> answering this question.
>
> --Steve
>
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