[EM] Re: Does MAM use the Copeland method?

[Ted Stern]

On 6 Oct 2004 at 12:13 PDT, Paul Kislanko wrote:
> Ok, let us just get this straight. I don't give a flying flip about any
> criterion, and I don't have a favorite method.
>
> I merely observe from the original ballots that 5 of 9 voters prefer C over
> A. So those are the ones who will be unhappy if A is elected.

But how unhappy will they be?  Only 3 of those voters strongly disapproved A.
The 2 voters who wanted C in first place are actually happy that B didn't win
(B wins approval), since B>C.

>
> That majority will initiate a referndum that changes the voting method
> because it selected the "wrong" candidate from the VOTERS perspective.

What makes you think it would pass?  Bucklin and Approval give the election to
B, but the A voters are happy, and the C voters would rather not end up with B
winning, so 2/3 of the voters would vote to keep Condorcet.

>
> You academics can say A is right, but if that is so, this just demonstrates
> that Plurality does as well as anything.

Just in this case.  Who should win this example? (from Rob LeGrand)

 98:A>C>E>D>B
 64:B>A>E>C>D
 12:B>A>E>D>C
 98:B>E>A>C>D
 13:B>E>A>D>C
125:B>E>D>A>C
124:C>A>E>D>B
 76:C>E>A>D>B
 21:D>A>B>E>C
 30:D>B>A>E>C
 98:D>B>E>C>A
139:D>C>A>B>E
 23:D>C>B>A>E

    A   B   C   D   E
A --- 458 461 485 511
B 463 --- 461 312 623
C 460 460 --- 460 460
D 436 609 461 --- 311
E 410 298 461 610 ---


B>E : 623
E>D : 610
D>B : 609
A>E : 511
A>D : 485
B>A : 463
A>C, B>C, D>C, E>C : 461

A wins Beatpath, B wins MAM (and plurality), C wins MinMax, D wins IRV, E wins
Bucklin.

Ted
-- 
Send real replies to
	ted stern at u dot washington dot edu

Frango ut patefaciam -- I break that I may reveal